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If we are ultimately to gain an understanding of the underlying causes of the 
worldwide slowdown of productivity growth in the 1970s and 1980s, analysts 
must  probe at the microeconomic level of  industries, firms, and establish- 
ments. The transportation sector has a special appeal for microeconomists, 
because of its long history of  government regulation, and more recently, the 
laboratory experiment provided by the virtually complete deregulation of do- 
mestic air transport and the substantial deregulation of railroads and intercity 
trucking. The transportation sector is endowed with a unique and largely pub- 
lic data base, as one beneficial side effect of its history of regulation, helping 
to explain why microeconomists have expended a disproportionate amount of 
effort studying an industry that in  1987 accounted for only 3.3  percent of total 
GNP and 5.9 percent of service GNP. 
As shown in table 10.1, the transportation sector illustrates the same gen- 
eral pattern of  post-1973 productivity slowdown as the total economy, only 
more so.’ The growth rate of average labor productivity (ALP) in the transpor- 
tation sector exhibited a sharper deceleration during 1973-87  (as compared to 
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1.  In what follows the terms “unrevised” and “revised’ refer to industry output data for 1977- 
87 published in the NIPA prior to and after January  1991. Table 10.1  links Kendrick’s (1961) 
estimates for the pre-1948  period  with  the unrevised NIPA data for the period since  1948; it 
provides the only long-run view of transportation productivity available to analysts prior to early 
1991. Below we shall incorporate the revised NIPA output data for 1977-88. 
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1948-73)  than did the nonfarm private economy, with respective slowdowns 
of  1.87 and 1.51 annual percentage points. The slowdown is even more seri- 
ous when  1973-87  is compared with  1909-48,  yielding a 3.71 point slow- 
down for transportation that is triple the 1.23 point slowdown for the economy 
as a whole.2 
How could the productivity performance in transportation be so lamentable 
in an era when deregulation was widely perceived as offering management a 
myriad of opportunities for pursuing operating efficiencies that were formerly 
prohibited by  regulators? This paper explores two complementary hypothe- 
ses: First, the data used in table 10.1 on the growth of ALP in transportation 
may incorporate a downward bias that is particularly large in the most recent 
decade. Second, productivity growth in the transportation sector is driven by 
the pace of  labor-saving and energy-saving innovation achieved outside that 
sector by the manufacturing firms that produce transportation equipment. The 
ALP data in table 10.1 do not take into account either capital or energy inputs 
and  thus do not rule out the possibility that multifactor productivity (MFP) 
growth  slowed  down  after  1973 by  less  than  labor  productivity  or  even 
speeded up. 
The objectives of this paper are to reconcile conflicting measures of output 
and employment, to examine aspects of unmeasured changes in the quality of 
output, to provide improved measures of  the quantity and quality of capital 
input, and to construct a consistent time series of MFP growth for the major 
transportation subsectors over the entire postwar period. The detailed analysis 
in this  paper is  limited  to  the three most  important subsectors, railroads, 
trucking, and airlines, which constituted 82 percent of nominal transportation 
output in 1973.3  The paper differs substantially from most of the literature on 
transportation productivity that has emerged in the past decade. With few ex- 
ceptions, recent studies of air and surface transport have estimated cost func- 
tions from panel data sets in which individual carriers are observed over time. 
Although the use of data for individual carriers allows the effects of firm size, 
network density, and other cross-section issues to be addressed, these studies 
are limited by the relatively short sample period of the available data. In con- 
trast, this paper attempts to assess the performance of the transportation sector 
over the entire postwar interval from  1948 to present, while sacrificing the 
added richness of data on individual carriers that are available for shorter pe- 
riods. Because the primary focus of this study is to address the measurement 
of  productivity in  national economic statistics, a move  along the trade-off 
curve toward a longer sample period and away from firm-specific observations 
seems appr~priate.~ 
2.  Mansfield (1965), using Kendrick’s data, treats the faster rate of productivity growth in 
transportation than in the aggregate economy as a well-accepted fact of  economic history. 
3. The remaining subsectors consist of local transit, water transportation, pipelines, and trans- 
portation services. 
4. For a review of the cost-oriented studies of productivity change, see Winston (1985, 66- 
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Table 10.1  Growth of Output per Hour in Nonfarm Private Economy, lkansportation 
Sector, and of Output per Employee for Subsectors, 1889-1987 
Sector  1889-1909  1909-29  1929-48  1948-73  1973-87  1889-1987 
Nonfarm private  2.27  2.18  2.12  2.43  0.92  2.07 
economy 
Transportation*  2.05  3.36  4.75  2.20  0.33  2.63 
Railroads'  1.88  1.58  2.95  3.66  1.24  2.40 
Trucking'.*  ...  ...  9.70  3.70  -0.28  ... 
Airlines'  ...  ...  8.25  5.33  -0.87  ... 
Local transit'.'  2.34  3.00  3.96  -3.34  -2.12  0.70 
Sources:  1889-1948-Nonfarm  private: Kendrick (1961). table A-XXIII, 338-40.  Transportation and 
subsectors: Kendrick (l96l), tables (3-11,  G-111, G-VIII, G-X, and G-IV.  1948-87-Nonfarm  Private: 
Economic Reporr offhe  President  1990, table C-46, 346. Transportation and subsectors: NIPA table 6.2 
divided by  table 6.1 1 for total transportation; divided by table 6.10B for subsectors. 
*The transportation sector includes minor subsectors not included here, mainly water, pipeline transpor- 
tation, and transportation services. 
'Per  employee, not per hour, for all subsectors 1948-87,  and for trucking and airlines 1929-48. 
*Intercity only 1929-48,  trucking and warehousing, 1948-87. 
'1889-1948,  local railways and bus lines. 
The longer  sample period provides  another  benefit.  Many  of  the earlier 
studies of  productivity  suffer from their timing; when data terminate in the 
period  1980-83,  they are inevitably  influenced by the idiosyncratic conflu- 
ence of high energy prices and low aggregate demand prevalent during that 
period. A study that can include data through the late 1980s benefits from the 
recovery of the economy to a macroeconomic condition comparable to earlier 
prosperous years, as well as the partial reversal of the  1974 and 1979-80  oil 
shocks. 
Part  10.1 of the paper contains an analysis of  measurement issues in the 
official U.S. government data on output and employment; it shows that the 
recent revisions of the industry output data in the national income and product 
accounts (NIPA) (de Leeuw, Mohr, and Parker 1991) resolve some inconsist- 
encies in output data but leave substantial divergences between official agen- 
cies in estimates of employment and ALP growth. After a discussion of gen- 
eral conceptual issues in part 10.2, the paper turns to the detailed analysis of 
the  subsectors.  Much  more  attention  is  devoted  to  air transportation  (part 
10.3) than to rail (part 10.4) or trucking (part 10.5). This reflects two impor- 
tant differences:  First,  because  rail  and trucking output consists almost en- 
tirely of  the carriage of freight, these subsectors provide intermediate rather 
covered, include Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (CCT) (1981). 1972-77; CCT (1983), 1970- 
80; CCT (1984). 1970-81;  CCT and Windle (1987), U.S.  and foreign airlines, 1970-83;  Sickles 
(1985).  1970-78;  and  Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1989),  1977-81.  Estimates of  MFP growth 
based on groups of  carriers  (domestic, international,  etc.) are available for  1948-81  in  CCT 
(1985) and for air transportation as a whole in Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) and Jor- 
genson (1990). 374  Robert J. Gordon 
than final goods. Hence any mismeasurement of productivity implies an off- 
setting adjustment in other industries rather than for the economy as a whole. 
In contrast, much of the output of air transport is sold directly to consumers, 
and so revisions to existing NIPA measures carry through to total GNP. Sec- 
ond, the quality of capital input in air transportation has changed much more 
dramatically over the postwar era than in rail or trucking, explaining our atten- 
tion to alternative measures of capital input for airlines. We  also incorporate 
changes in nonconventional inputs, including purchased services (e.g., those 
provided by travel agents) and government expenditures on airports, air traffic 
control, and highways. 
10.1  Conflicts in the Official Data 
10.1.1  The Discrepancy between NIPA and BLS 
The U.S. official statistical system provides two independent measures of 
ALP in the transportation sector, but no estimates of MFP.5 Accordingly in 
part 10.1 we take a close look at the official output and employment data that 
enter into estimates of ALP like those already examined in table 10.1. One set 
of official ALP measures is provided by the NIPA, which contain estimates of 
real output and employment for total transportation and seven subsectors (see 
n. a, to table 10.  l), and of  hours for total transportation but not the subsec- 
tors. Measures of ALP can be constructed for the years since 1948 as the ratio 
of  output to one of several alternative employment series.6  Although in prin- 
ciple the NIPA measure of output is gross product originating, that is, value 
added, in practice value added is calculated by  double deflation only since 
1977; prior to 1977 value added is calculated only for rail transport. Output in 
air and truck transportation is based on deflated gross revenue prior to 1977. 
Another set of ALP measures is provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) Office of  Productivity and Technology over most of  the postwar pe- 
riod.’ The data published by the BLS include gross output, employment, and 
output per employee for five transportation subsectors (the same as NIPA mi- 
nus water transportation and transportation services, and with some defini- 
5. The BLS publishes MFP series only for the total economy (private and private nonfarm) and 
for the manufacturing sector (see Mark and Waldorf  1983). MFP estimates are published at the 
disaggregated  level for only four industries: tires and  inner tubes,  steel,  footwear, and motor 
vehicles and equipment (U.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1990). 
6. These are full-time and part-time employees (NIPA, table 6.6B),  full-time equivalent em- 
ployees (table 6.7B), and persons engaged (table 6.10B). All NIPA ALP measures in this paper 
are based on persons engaged. Results would be almost identical for rail and air using full-time 
equivalent employees, which make up 100 percent of persons engaged for rail and 99 percent for 
air, but not for trucking, where self-employment is more important. 
7.  Published BLS indexes begin in 1958; unpublished estimates for air and rail begin in  1947 
and for trucking begin in 1954. See the notes to table 10.2. A general introduction to the BLS 
methodology for the indexes covering the service sector is provided by Dean and Kunze (chap. 2, 
in this vol.). 375  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
tional differences discussed below). Hours and output per hour are also in- 
cluded for railroads and bus carriers. Output is measured by  physical output 
data reported by regulatory agencies; in the case of railroads raw data on ton- 
miles are adjusted for changes in the composition of goods carried.8 Data on 
employment and hours include the self-employed and come from the BLS 
establishment survey. An important conceptual difference between the NIPA 
and BLS series is that the BLS incorporates links when definitional changes 
occur in  source data; the NIPA data do not. Below we find that this helps to 
explain the difference between NIPA  and BLS estimates of  airline employ- 
ment. 
Table 10.2 provides our first detailed look at ALP data for the transportation 
sector and three subsectors. The NIPA  data in  the top section of  table 10.2 
duplicate those in  table  10.1 for the three subsectors but differ for the total 
transportation sector by reporting output per employee rather than output per 
hour and by  excluding the four minor transportation  sector^.^ The NIPA out- 
put data for 1977-87  are the unrevised series published prior to  1991, pre- 
sented here in order to highlight the sharp discrepancies between the NIPA 
and BLS data that in part motivated the recent NIPA revisions (subsequently 
we  examine the revised output data in table  10.4 below). Growth rates are 
shown for intervals broken in  1958 (the starting year of  the published BLS 
data), 1973, 1979, and 1987. The productivity growth slowdown in the final 
column compares 1973-87  with 1958-73 (not 1948-73  as in table 10.1). The 
post-1973 productivity growth slowdown is much larger in table  10.2 than 
table 10.1, mainly because pre-1973 productivity growth is held down in table 
10.1 by  the inclusion of local transit (where productivity collapsed, particu- 
larly during 1948-58). 
The BLS data shown in the middle section of table 10.2 tell a very different 
story from the unrevised NIPA data shown in the top section, particularly for 
1979-87  when the growth rate of BLS ALP for total transportation exceeds 
that of NIPA  ALP by 4.43 points per year.Io The BLS slowdown occurs en- 
tirely for airlines, and there is virtually no slowdown for railroads and truck- 
ing. The bottom section of table 10.2 subtracts each NIPA growth rate from 
the corresponding BLS rate and shows that the discrepancy was large for all 
three major subsectors over 1973-87. 
8. This adjustment is based on Interstate Commerce Commission data on unit revenue for 200 
commodity lines, see Mark (1988, 146-47).  This source indicates that a similar adjustment was 
formerly made for trucking, but that the disaggregated commodity data from the source agency 
were discontinued at an unspecified date. 
9. The “minor” sectors included in the transportation total in table 10.1 but excluded in table 
10.2 and subsequent tables are local transit,  water transportation,  pipelines,  and transportation 
services. 
10. The BLS does not publish data for the aggregate transportation industry. In tables 10.2 and 
table  10.3 we use a quasi-Tornqvist index that takes the shortcut of aggregating over multiyear 
intervals (using the average shares in the first and last year of each interval), rather than of aggre- 
gating each year-to-year change and averaging these. The Tornqvist formula is shown to be one 
of  the class of “superlative” index numbers by  Diewert (1976). The same formula is labeled the 
Tornqvist-Theil-translog  index by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982). 376  Robert J. Gordon 
Table 10.2  Growth of Output per Employee, Unrevised NIPA versus BLS, Selected 
Intervals, 1948-1987 
Slowdown, 
1973-87  - 















BLS -  NIPA: 
2.96  4.15  1.06 
2.17  4.65  1.37 
3.59  3.78  0.18 
7.39  3.96  2.72 
n.a.  4.44  3.03 
1.75  5.46  1.48 
n.a.  2.86  3.15 
8.43  6.64  4.66 
n.a.  0.29  1.97 
-0.42  0.82  0.11 
n.a.  -0.92  2.97 













3.88  0.11 
3.66  1.24 
3.70  -0.28 
5.33  -0.87 
n.a.  3.50 
4.46  5.30 
n.a.  2.59 
6.16  3.83 
n.a.  3.39 
0.80  4.06 
n.a.  2.87 
0.83  4.70 
-4.04 
-3.41 










Sources: NIPA: Output per employee is calculated as output from table 6.2, as published most recently 
in the July 1988 Survey ofcurrent Business, divided by persons engaged from table 6.10B. BLS: Output, 
employees, and  output per employee for  1958-63  are from BLS bulletin no.  2296,  134-38,  and for 
1963-87  are from bulletin no. 2349, 142-46.  For railroads and air transportation data for  1948-58  are 
available in unpublished computer printouts,  BLS Office of  Productivity and Technology, January  16, 
1990. 
*The transportation aggregate for BLS is obtained by  weighting the BLS growth rates of output and of 
total  employment by  a quasi-Tomqvist  method. Output and employment growth in each subsector is 
weighted by  the NIPA nominal output weight (table 6.  I) for the average of  the initial and terminal year 
within each interval, e.g., the average of  1973 and  1979 weights for the  1973-79  interval. Aggregate 
transportation in NIPA includes railroad transportation,  trucking and warehousing, and  air transporta- 
tion. The BLS aggregate includes railroad traffic (revenue traffic), intercity trucking, and air transporta- 
tion. n.a. indicates “not available.” 
Because ALP is the ratio of output to employment, the discrepancy between 
the BLS and NIPA data could result from differences in the treatment of out- 
put, employment, or some combination of both. A decomposition is provided 
in table 10.3, which expresses the difference between the BLS and NIPA an- 
nual growth rates of output in the top part of the table and of employment in 
the bottom part. Here we learn, surprisingly, that the puzzle for total transpor- 
tation  after 1973 lies almost entirely  in  the differing data on employment, 
albeit this aggregation disguises very large and offsetting differences for out- 
put growth in the four subsectors. 
10.1.2  The NIPA Output Revisions and Remaining Discrepancies 
In  earlier  versions  of  this  research,  beginning  with  Baily  and  Gordon 
(1988), we showed that the slow growth in the unrevised NIPA output series 
for railroads and airlines relative to the more rapid growth of the BLS output 377  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
Table 10.3  Difference between BLS and Unrevised NIPA Estimates of Output 



























-  2.19 
-0.30 
-  3.53 
-  1.19 
1.17 
6.87 




-  4.83 
-  1.91 
0.67 
3.84 





-  1.60 
-0.31 
2.68 
-  1.78 




-  1.29 
Sources and notes: Same as table  10.2 
series could be traced to overdeflation. In particular, the NIPA price deflators 
for airline output and for consumer expenditures on  airline transportation 
made little or no allowance for discount fares in the 1977-83 period and thus 
rose much too quickly, causing deflated gross revenues to increase much too 
slowly. The same problem appears to have plagued the previous NIPA railroad 
deflators. Responding to this criticism, the revised NIPA industry gross output 
estimates have shifted from deflated gross revenue to physical volume mea- 
sures (as well as shifting to double deflation, i.e., subtracting purchased in- 
puts, for trucking and airlines, as was done previously for railroads). The top 
section of  table  10.4 shows that the revised NIPA  indexes for 1977-87  now 
rise faster than the BLS indexes for all three subsectors; previously this was 
true only for trucking. The revision for railroads is an astonishing 7.5 percent 
per annum, and for airlines a smaller but substantial figure of 4 percent per 
annum. 
Nevertheless, as shown in the middle and bottom sections of table 10.4, the 
BLS series on ALP in total transportation, as well as for the trucking and 
airline subsectors, rises faster than the NIPA ALP series, despite more rapid 
growth of NIPA output. This occurs because the BLS registers slower growth 
in  employment in each sector. Although the difference for railroads is not 
important, that for trucking and airlines makes a substantial difference. 
10.1.3  Sources of Employment Discrepancies 
By  far the most important remaining discrepancy concerns trucking em- 
ployment. An important definitional difference between NIPA and BLS is that 
the former includes all trucking (intercity and local), as well as warehousing; 
BLS includes only a fraction of  intercity trucking.  Table  10.5 displays the 
1979 and  1987 values, and  1987/1979 ratios, for a variety of  measures of 378  Robert J. Gordon 
Table 10.4  Growth Rates for Revised NIPA, Unrevised NIPA, BLS, and 
Differences for Output and Output per Employee, for Interval 
1917-1987 
BLS-  BLS- 
Unrevised  Revised  Unrevised  Revised 

































































-  1.90 





-  1.87 
1.57 
-  1.50 
3.17 
0.75 
Sources: Same as table  10.2, except  revised NIPA  output from de Leeuw,  Mohr, and  Parker 
(1991). table 6, 34. 
nominal and real output, price indexes,  and employment in the trucking in- 
dustry.  The  data  include  both  measures  for  the  comprehensive  trucking- 
warehousing universe partially covered by the NIPA, and the intercity subsec- 
tor covered by the BLS. To summarize our conclusions in advance, we find 
that the NIPA data correspond closely to independent measures of the trucking 
universe, but that the BLS data are badly biased by  including only a part of 
the intercity subsector that has experienced a sharply reduced share of output 
and employment as a result of deregulation. 
The nominal output data in section 1 of table 10.5 show a close correspon- 
dence for the  1987/1979 ratio of, respectively,  NIPA nominal  output and a 
related  measure  called  “outlays  for highway  freight transportation” (which 
includes both intercity and local transportation). A separate series for intercity 
class I carriers (line Id) indicates a much slower increase in revenue, resulting 
from a shift in the composition of intercity freight away from class I carriers. 
Three price series are shown in section 2, the NIPA implicit deflator, an 
implicit price series that results when the intercity outlays series in line lc is 
divided by the output series in line 3b, and a direct measure of revenue per 
ton-mile for class I intercity freight. The implicit intercity price increases at 
about the same rate as the NIPA deflator; the direct measure of  revenue per 
ton-mile increases less. Because all three deflators in section 2 refer to inter- 
city freight,  they  should be  viewed  as different measures of  the  same con- 379  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
Table 10.5  Comparison of Data on Nominal and Real Output, Price Indexes, 
and Employment for Total and Intercity lkucking, 1979 and 1987 
1987/ 
1979  1987  1979(%) 
1. Nominal output (in billions of dollars): 
a. Revised NIPA (table 6.1) 
b. Outlays on highway freight 
c. Outlays on intercity freight 
d. Operating revenue, class I intercity freight carriers 
a. Revised NIPA implicit deflator for trucking output, 
b. Intercity outlays per ton mile (in cents) (Ic13b) 
c. Class I intercity revenue per ton mile (in cents) 
a. NIPA output in 1982 dollars (table 6.2) 
b. Intercity freight ton miles (in billions) 
c. Implicit real revenue (in billions of  1987 dollars), 
Class I intercity freight carriers 
d. BLS output index (1977 = 100) 
a. NIPA (no. of persons engaged) 
b. BLS trucking and warehousing employment 
c. Class I intercity freight carriers 
d. BLS employment level 
2. Price indexes: 
1982 = IW(ld3a) 
3. Real output: 















57  1 
65.2  157.5 
220.3  154.4 
132.8  147.2 
35.0  116.3 
99.8  133.6 
19.9  134.7 
14.1  121.6 
65.3  117.9 
666  109.5 
35.0  96.2 
94.3  90.4 
1674  111.7 
1464  109.2 
519  93.3 
434  76.0 
Sources  by  line:  (la,2a,3a) de  Leeuw,  Mohr,  and  Parker  (1991),  tables  5  and  6, 33-34. 
(3d) Basic  BLS  source,  same  as  table  10.2.  (lb,lc) Statistical  Absrracr,  1989, table  998. 
(ld,4c) 1979-80,  TRINC Associates,  linked for  1980-87  to Statistical  Abstract.  1990, table 
1055, sum of figures given for common carrier general freight, common carrier other than gen- 
eral  freight,  contract  carrier  other  than  general  freight,  and  carriers  of  household  goods. 
(2b) lc/3b.  (2c) Narional Transporfarion Statistics,  annual report  1989, U.S. Department of 
Transportation for 1977-87,  1981 issue for 1969-76,  1972 issue for 1960-68.  (3b) Statistical 
Abstracr,  1989, table 1OOO. (3c) Equals line Id for 1987. For  1979 equals line Id for 1979 times 
198711979 ratio from line 2c. (4a) Basic NIPA source, same as table 10.2. (4b) Staristical Ab- 
stract, 1989, table 999, totals given for SIC 421,422, and 423. (4d)  Source of BLS employment 
data provided by  Edwin Dean (American Trucking Association,  1987 Motor  Carrier Annual 
Report), lists total employment in  1987 as 349,842. To this is added 84,000 leased drivers, as 
stated in a letter from Dean.  1979 employment equals 1987 employment times the  1979/1987 
ratio of the BLS trucking employment index. 
cept."  We  view the final measure in line 2c as superior, as it is a direct mea- 
sure of  revenue yield per ton-mile, rather than an implicit ratio of  numerator 
and denominator that may not cover the same universe. 
The intercity output series on line 3b rises at about the same rate as the 
NIPA  real output series; a constructed series (line 3c) for the implied real 
11. The source listing provided by de Leeuw, Mohr, and Parker (1990, table 3) indicates that 
the nominal value is based on class I motor carriers and real output is based on a physical measure 
of  ton-mile volume, which could only refer to intercity freight, as ton-miles for local traffic are 
not available. 380  Robert J. Gordon 
revenue of class I intercity carriers based on the implicit price series from line 
2c declines  somewhat slower than the BLS output series for Class I and I1 
intercity carriers (line 3d), as would be consistent with the evidence presented 
below that the BLS has been measuring a shrinking fraction of the intercity 
trucking industry.  l2 The employment data display the same ranking of  19871 
1979 ratios as the output data, except that the BLS employment series shows 
even more relative shrinkage, contributing to the relatively favorable perform- 
ance of the BLS productivity  series examined previously  in table  10.2. To 
track down the source of the rapid decline in the BLS employment series, we 
have attempted to reconstruct  the absolute level on which the BLS series is 
based in 1979 and 1987 (see source notes to table 10.5). If  these figures are 
correct, they imply that coverage by the BLS of the NIPA employment total 
fell sharply from 38.1 percent in 1979 to 25.9 percent in 1987.13 
In our detailed examination of the trucking industry in part 10.5 below, we 
learn that there was a huge shift in the composition of firms in the intercity 
trucking industry as a result of deregulation. The BLS, by choosing to cover 
a portion of the industry that is declining in importance,  has misrepresented 
employment trends in the industry as a whole. This leaves as a mystery why 
the segment of the industry covered by the BLS exhibits healthy productivity 
growth over 1979-87;  NIPA productivity growth for the trucking industry as 
a whole is a barely positive 0.7 percent per annum slightly (line 3a divided by 
4a).I4 If both the NIPA and BLS productivity data are correct, they imply a 
slight decline in the absolute level of ALP between 1979 and 1987 for the part 
of the NIPA trucking universe not covered by the BLS.I5 
Because of its much greater coverage,  the NIPA output and employment 
series are preferable to those of the BLS. There remains a potential measure- 
ment error in the NIPA output series, because of the possibility of  an overly 
rapid increase in the implicit deflator. The direct measure of class I revenue 
per ton-mile rises 1.2 percent per annum less than the NIPA deflator. Support- 
12.  The intercity freight output series on line 3b comes from a source that allows the relative 
share of railroad and trucking output to be computed; these shares are almost identical to those in 
data independently collected by Winston et al. (1990, table  1-1). 
13. We  were unsuccessful in locating additional independent sources of trucking employment 
over the full 1979-87 period. In particular the TRINC data used in table 10.5 for 1958-80  are not 
available after 1983. 
14.  Despite its tantalizing title, the recent article by  Ying (1990) contains only estimated pa- 
rameters allowing a calculation of the marginal effect of deregulation on trucking productivity, but 
no data on the level or rate of change of actual productivity. 
15.  If  revenue per employee were the same in the BLS and non-BLS part of  the total NIPA 
trucking universe at the 1987 level of $78,876 reported by  the BLS source (American Trucking 
Association, 1987  Moror Carrier Annual Report, summary table I, col. 7, then the implied 1987 
revenue figures are $34.2 billion for BLS, $97.8 billion for non-BLS, and $132.0 billion for the 
total. Using NIPA real output to extrapolate the total back to a 1979 figure of $124.1 billion real 
revenue in 1987 dollars for the total, and the BLS output index to obtain a 1979 figure of $37.8 
billion for the BLS segment, the implied non-BLS real  1979 revenue is $86.3 billion.  Implied 
non-BLS real revenue per non-BLS employee fell from $93,096 to $78,876, for an implied de- 
cline in non-BLS productivity of 15.3 percent. 381  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
ing a slower price increase is the contrast of the 33.6 percent  1979-87  in- 
crease of the NIPA deflator with the increases in the prices of  inputs, 35.8 
percent for labor and 28.6 percent for diesel fuel.l6  Output prices should have 
increased less than input prices if there was an improvement in labor produc- 
tivity and fuel efficiency; the improvement in fuel efficiency is a solid fact; 
labor productivity increased even with the NIPA deflator and even more with 
the alternative deflator.”  In part  10.5 we explore the consequences of replac- 
ing the NIPA output index with an alternative index based on the deflator in 
line 2c of table 10.5. 
In the airline subsector NIPA  employment also grows substantially more 
rapidly than BLS employment, but here the discrepancy is resolved in favor 
of the BLS series. The most important cause of this difference, also uncovered 
by  Card (1989, table  lO.l), is that Federal  Express was added to industry 
output  and  employment  figures  in  1986. Because  Federal  Express  carries 
high-value shipments, it has an extremely low ALP measured as ton-miles per 
employee, less than one-tenth that of American Airlines in  1989.18  Thus the 
introduction of Federal Express into the statistics introduces a spurious down- 
ward shift in the ALP of the airline industry that the BLS handles by linking 
out Federal Express output and employment. A  superior approach, but one 
with more onerous data requirements, would be to follow Caves, Christensen, 
and Tretheway (1981, 1983, 1984) by constructing a Tornqvist output index 
that weights different output components by their revenue shares. Because it 
recognizes the Federal Express problem and makes two other links to improve 
comparability, we deem the BLS output and employment data to be superior 
to those in the NIPA and use them in part 10.3 below.I9 
10.1.4  Choice of Series for Further Study 
Subsequent sections of this paper develop new measures of  MFP for the 
three  transportation  subsectors.  Our desired  output  concept  is gross rather 
than value added, because we want to include fuel and materials inputs explic- 
itly in the MFP calculation. The BLS output measures have the double advan- 
tage that they explicitly measure gross output and are conceptually consistent 
over the postwar period; the NIPA  output  series is inconsistent,  measuring 
16.  Labor cost is compensation per full-time equivalent employee, NIPA table 6.4B divided 
by table 6.7B. The fuel cost is the retail price of diesel fuel, from American Trucking Trends. 
17. Average miles per gallon for single-unit trucks increased by  14 percent from 1979 to 1986 
(American Trucking Trends 1987, 44). The 1979-87  percentage increase in ALP is 5.5 percent 
for the NIPA deflator (table 10.5, line 3a/4a) and 16 percent for the alternative deflator. 
18. Making the arbitrary assumption that Federal Express shipments travel 700 miles on aver- 
age, one can calculate from its 1989 annual report an average of  10,233 ton miles per employee, 
in contrast to American’s 115,716 (ton miles per “average equivalent employee,” from an Ameri- 
can Airlines, annual report). 
19.  According to Richard Carnes of the BLS, the two other links occur in the 1979-81 period 
were made necessary by the elimination of the distinction between certificated and noncertificated 
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value added throughout only for railroads, while switching in 1977 from gross 
output to value added for trucking and airlines. Although it would be desirable 
to use the BLS indexes throughout for consistency, the above analysis of data 
discrepancies suggests that a mixed set of sources is superior. 
Railroads.  The BLS and NIPA  employment series are very close, so the 
choice of  the BLS series raises no problem. However, since 1977 the NIPA 
railroad output series rises almost 2 percent per annum faster than the BLS 
output series. About half of this difference reflects the BLS practice of weight- 
ing several hundred traffic classes by  unit revenue weights, which approxi- 
mates the practice of Tomqvist aggregation advocated by Caves, Christensen, 
and Tretheway (198 1) and is conceptually superior to the Bureau of  Economic 
Analysis (BEA) index that is based on unweighted ton-miles. The remaining 
half of  the difference reflects the distinction between gross output and value 
added; the latter increases more rapidly as a result of increased fuel efficiency. 
Both of  these differences point to the use of the BLS gross output series for 
railroads and adjusting explicitly for fuel efficiency. 
Trucking. We concluded above that the NIPA output and employment series 
for trucking are much superior to the BLS series, which cover a shrinking 
segment of  the industry. Because the NIPA  output series represents value 
added since 1977, our MFP index for trucking since 1977 should not adjust 
for fuel and materials inputs, because this would amount to subtracting these 
inputs twice. 
Airlines. As noted above, the BLS employment series for airlines incorpo- 
rates adjustments that make it superior to the NIPA series, and for consistency 
we also use the BLS output series. For 1977-87  the revised NIPA output se- 
ries grows only about one percent per annum faster than the BLS output se- 
ries, and much of this may reflect increased fuel efficiency that we take into 
account separately. 
10.2  Conceptual Issues 
10.2.1  MFP Growth and the Cost-Function Approach 
The production process in transportation is well described by  the standard 
economic theory of production, with a few unique features. Because the for- 
mal interpretation of MFP indexes within the cost-function approach has been 
clearly developed elsewhere, here we limit the discussion to the implications 
for the MFP indexes that we develop subsequently.20 
10.2.2 
The cost-function approach emphasizes that  standard  measures of  MFP 
growth are equivalent to the shift in the production function and cost function 
Issues in the Estimation of MFP Growth 
20.  See Denny, Fuss, and Waverman (1981, 187-95)  and the appendix in Good, Nadiri, and 
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only in the presence of constant returns to scale. With increasing returns, the 
growth of MFP exaggerates the shift in the production and cost functions by 
including the contribution of  economies of  scale to economic growth. Be- 
cause the proper measurement of returns to scale requires data on outputs and 
inputs at the level of the firm or establishment, the findings in this paper based 
on industry-level data must be qualified to the extent that more disaggregated 
studies have determined that nonconstant returns to scale are important. 
Other issues emerging from the cost-function literature include departures 
from marginal cost pricing and effective rate-of-return regulation. The first of 
these appears to be most important in industries that practice cross subsidiza- 
tion, as in the case of telephone communications studied by  Denny, Fuss, and 
Waverman (1981), and involves the mismeasurement of  output growth be- 
cause of  the application of  incorrect weights in aggregating outputs and in- 
puts. We  are able to sidestep this issue in studying the transportation sector, 
because it is of  secondary importance. Although airlines and railroads pro- 
duce multiple outputs,  their revenues are overwhelmingly dominated by  a 
single product, scheduled passenger travel in  the case of  airlines and freight 
carriage in the case of railroads. 
The second issue, rate-of-return regulation, is clearly relevant for transpor- 
tation. Denny, Fuss, and Waverman (1981,  199) show that, if  prices of  ex- 
pensed factors of production and the allowed rate of return are increasing over 
time, then estimates of technical change that ignore rate-of-return regulation 
overestimate the true underlying rate of technical change. This finding is im- 
portant for any investigation that includes the period of deregulation, because 
it could lead to an erroneous conclusion that the rate of technical change had 
been decreased as a result of deregulation. Although we make no adjustment 
for this potential bias in our study of railroads and trucking, we have sufficient 
data to decompose changes in airline efficiency into changes achieved by  air- 
craft manufacturers and changes in the intensity of use of aircraft, particularly 
changes in load factors and in the seating density of  given aircraft, that may 
reflect  in part the influence of regulation and subsequent deregulation. 
Hulten (1986) and Berndt and Fuss (1986) have emphasized a problem in 
productivity measurement that applies to any industry, not just to the regulated 
sector. If output is produced by capital services, that is, by the utilized portion 
of the capital stock, then conventional measures of MFP growth based on data 
on the capital stock (implicitly assuming constant utilization) err by  treating 
the effect on productivity of changing utilization as a shift in the production 
function. Below in table  10.15 we address this issue by  providing estimates 
of  MFP growth that  are adjusted for changes in  utilization in the national 
economy. 
10.2.3  Causes of Changes in MFP 
We  conclude part 10.2 by discussing causes of productivity change that are 
common to different subsectors of transportation, and reserve for the remain- 384  Robert J. Gordon 
ing sections of the paper a detailed consideration of those causes that are spe- 
cific to particular subsectors. 
I.  Unmeasured changes in the quality of  output. Because it mainly provides 
a consumer service rather than an intermediate input, air transportation raises 
more questions of unmeasured quality change than do rail and trucking. Com- 
puters,  for instance,  have produced unmeasured quality deterioration in the 
form of restrictions and penalties on airline tickets, balanced by advance seat 
selection and boarding passes, frequent-flyer awards, and the potential  wel- 
fare gains of  price discrimination  to price-sensitive  travelers. Other dimen- 
sions of quality change include the benefits of increased speed made possible 
by improved aircraft, the effects of congestion,  noise, flight frequency, wait- 
ing time,  and safety. Both noise and pollution  are relevant for railroads and 
trucking, as is the increased speed of rail shipments made possible by dereg- 
ulation. 
2. Quality of  inputs, especially capital. In the macrosources-of-growth lit- 
erature there is a substantial controversy about the effects on MFP of changes 
in labor quality. Having summarized the issues recently, we say nothing new 
about this here (Baily and Gordon 1988, 370-76).  Here our main emphasis is 
on  changes  in  the  quality  of  capital.  The growing  literature  on  computer 
prices, recently  surveyed by Triplett (1  989), has yielded a consensus that the 
proper measure of utilized capital input that appears in the production function 
is  a vector of  input characteristics  of  capital,  defined  as any attribute of  a 
capital good that has a positive marginal product,  including the horsepower 
and physical dimensions of a truck, or memory size and speed for a computer. 
Recently  (Gordon  1990a) I have constructed  a number of new deflators for 
investment  goods; my approach to price measurement for capital goods em- 
phasizes the need for accurate attribution of quality changes among producers 
and users of capital goods.*’ Manufacturers should be “credited’ not only with 
improvements in performance,  but also with cost-saving innovations  in en- 
ergy efficiency, durability, and maintenance costs. 
To  make sense in conjunction  with my quality-adjusted measures of  real 
capital input, calculations of MFP growth must include fuel or energy as an 
input. My method credits equipment manufacturers for improvements in fuel 
economy  that are not accompanied  by proportional increases in real equip- 
ment cost. Thus new technology that improves fuel efficiency enters the cal- 
culation of transportation MFP growth as an increase in the growth of capital 
input  (which  reduces  MFP growth)  and  is  balanced  by  a  decrease  in  the 
growth of fuel input (which boosts MFP growth).  If  the calculation is done 
properly, the faster capital input growth and slower fuel input growth exactly 
offset each other and no change occurs in transportation MFP growth. This is 
the correct conclusion, because by assumption the technical achievement oc- 
curs in the manufacturing  sector, not in the transportation sector. The many 
recent detailed studies of productivity growth in transportation have devoted 
21.  A brief summary of the methodology and results of  this book-length study is available in 
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remarkably little attention to the issue of  capital quality, and hence in this 
example credits the transportation sector for faster MFP growth that has been 
achieved elsewhere.22 
10.3  Air lkansportation 
10.3.1  The Long-Run Behavior of Productivity and Relative Price 
The U.S. airline industry commenced operations in the late 1920s, and by 
1935 almost all of today’s largest domestic airlines were operating under their 
present names. Total industry output in 1987 exceeded that in 1935 by a factor 
of  1650, for an annual growth rate during the intervening years of  14.2 per- 
cent. The growth performance since 1935 is summarized in the top half of 
table 10.6. ALP growth marched along at a rock-solid 7.1 percent throughout 
the period 1935-69,  even though output growth in the two decades after 1948 
fell by  half  compared to  1935-48.  This casts doubt on the importance of 
increasing returns in the long run, because the post-1948 decline in output 
growth should have reduced ALP growth if scale economies were important. 
The bottom half of table 10.6 displays the ratio of United Airlines output and 
productivity to that for the air transport industry as a whole. Although United 
was the largest airline during 1931-38  and again from 1961 to 1988, there is 
no evidence that it gained any advantage from its large scale. In fact, its ALP 
grew slightly slower than that for the industry, 5.73 versus 6.25 annual per- 
centage points, respectively. 
If  an industry enjoys ALP growth that is more rapid than for the economy 
as a whole, its real price should decline. The final column of table 10.6 shows 
that this occurred for the airline industry during 1935-87,  although the rela- 
tionship is not exact, as the relative price of an industry’s output depends not 
only on relative ALP growth but also on changes in relative input costs and in 
the relative productivity of factors of production other than labor. 
Our inference that the airline industry is subject to constant returns in the 
long run accords with the view originally established by R. Caves (1962) and 
reinforced  by  Douglas and  Miller  (1974) and White (1979).  Recently,  D. 
Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984) find economies of  scale to “den- 
sity,” adding more flights per city served, but agree with the previous literature 
that larger firm output accompanied by an increased size of network, holding 
density constant, is subject to constant returns. We  return below to the effects 
of deregulation on route structure and density.23 
22. Many papers on airline productivity cite the detailed panel data set constructed by Caves, 
Christensen, and Tretheway (1981) and extended in subsequent papers. These authors carry out a 
detailed aggregation of major aircraft types,  as do we in part  10.3 below, but they weight each 
aircraft type by its lease cost. If lease cost is proportional to purchase price, then their procedure 
is equivalent to assuming that the input characteristics of  different models of  aircraft differ in 
proportion to their purchase price, which greatly understates the quality of newer models. 
23.  Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1981) also show that there are systematic differences 
in managerial efficiency over time that are not related to scale. In reporting these results, they 
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Table 10.6  Long-Run Behavior of Output, Employment, and Passenger Yield, 
Airline Industry and United Airlines, 1985-1987 
Real 
Year  Ton Miles  Employees  Employee  Yield 
Revenue  Output per  Passenger 
Annual Growth Rate, U.S.  Domestic & International Scheduled Air Carriers 
1935-41  26.43  19.21  7.07  -4.02 
1941-48  24.58  16.61  7.08  -5.52 
1948-59  13.58  6.03  7.05  -  2.82 
195949  13.48  6.42  7.06  -2.72 
1969-78  6.26  0.60  5.66  -2.51 
1978-87  5.81  2.03  3.78  -  1.92 
Ratio, Index of  Each Variable  for United Airlines to Index  for Air Transport Industry 
(1978 = 1.0) 
1935  1.48  1.22  1.22  1.15 
1941  1.11  0.84  1.32  1.03 
1948  0.89  0.81  1.09  1.01 
1959  0.84  0.80  1.06  1.08 
1969  1.08  1.03  1.05  1  .oo 
1978  1  .oo  1  .oo  1 .oo  1 .oo 
1987  0.95  1.03  0.93  1 .oo 
Sources: For  1948-87,  industry output and employment are obtained from the same sources as 
table  10.4. For 1935-48,  data are obtained from the CAB Handbook ofAirline Staristics. Do- 
mestic revenue ton  miles were linked to total revenue ton miles prior to  1943. Real passenger 
yield  is passenger revenue divided by  revenue passenger miles times the GNP deflator. United 
Airlines data come from company annual reports, selected issues. 
Our treatment of  airline productivity treats two main topics,  unmeasured 
changes in output  quality and new  measures of  inputs  (especially  capital). 
Improvements in output quality can be achieved both by aircraft manufactur- 
ers and by airline operators. The most dramatic changes in quality prior to the 
1970s occurred as manufacturers made possible the shift to larger and faster 
piston planes, and then to jet aircraft; these are treated below in the context of 
input measurement. First we examine issues in the changing quality of airline 
output achieved within the airline industry itself, and this concentrates on the 
period since deregulation in the late 1970s, an interval during which interval 
the quality of aircraft has been relatively stable. 
10.3.2 
Airline deregulation  is widely believed  to have  substantially  changed the 
production process by shifting airline service from nonstop point-to-point ser- 
vice to connecting service through hubs, thereby increasing flight mileage to 
travel between origin and destination.  In the upper left-hand of  figure 10.1, 
the dashed line indicates the nonstop flight between origin A and destination 
B flown prior to deregulation,  and the solid lines show the roundabout route 
through hub H1  flown after deregulation.  If  correct,  this “standard model” 
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Routing effects of airline deregulation: Standard model compared to 
would have the important implications that official measures of output in the 
1980s overstate true output measured from origin to destination and that mea- 
sures of  yield  understate  the true origin-to-destination  price.  This standard 
view is frequently encountered in academic work,24  and it appears to be uni- 
versally held by  journalist^.^^ 
24.  McGowan and Seabright (1989, 326, 329) support verbally the graphical interpretation in 
the top left frame of figure 10.1:  “a traveller from A to B takes off and lands twice instead of once, 
takes longer to reach the destination, travels further in total and may have to suffer the inconve- 
nience of changing aircraft and an increased risk of baggage loss or missed connections.  . . . it is 
important, therefore, that the true social costs of making indirect rather than direct flights should 
be borne by carriers.” Similarly, Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1989, 7) state that “increased use of 
hub-and-spoke and loop type networks . . . allow carriers to increase load factors, but they artifi- 
cally inflate the level of real production by increasing the air miles between cities and by reducing 
the likelihood of non-stop service.” 
25.  Samples include “instead of  flying a  ‘linear’ route system,  with criss-crossing services 
between cities, airlines have developed more efficient hub-and-spoke systems” (The Economist, 388  Robert J. Gordon 
The most widely cited advocate of the standard view is Dempsey (1990), 
who claims that the hub-and-spoke  system has caused passengers to fly be- 
tween 5 percent and 30 percent additional mileage on a given trip, implying 
that a portion of  productivity gains measured by passenger-miles is illusory. 
Dempsey uses this finding (1990, 32) sharply to criticize the cost-benefit anal- 
ysis of  deregulation by Morrison  and Winston  (1986) for failing to take ac- 
count of the time cost of “greater circuitry attributable to hub and spoking.” 
Although it might seem from Dempsey’s critique that the output and price data 
examined in part  10.1, above, are flawed by failing to adjust for circuitry, in 
fact the  issue is of trivial  importance.  Borenstein  has estimated that,  if  all 
domestic air travel were nonstops and there were no connections at all, total 
domestic  flight mileage  would be  reduced  only by  about 4 percent,  but of 
course there were plenty of connections before as well as after deregulation, 
so that the net circuitry effect must have been much less than 4 percent even if 
the percentage of flights involving connections has increased substantially.26 
In assessing  unmeasured  aspects of quality change  in airline output, the 
issue of  connections and hub-and-spoke routings is central. Justifying a new 
assessment is that academic studies by Morrison and Winston (1986, 1989) 
and others use data  for  1983 and earlier years produced by  the  U.S. Civil 
Aeronautics  Board  (CAB) prior  to its  1984 “sunset.”  There is virtually  no 
evidence available for any recent year that takes account of the 1986-87  wave 
of mergers and the failures of numerous new entrants.27 
To provide a fresh look at the routing opportunities available to travelers, 
we have assembled  a virtually  complete census of routes,  and of  the daily 
number of flights per route, flown by the air transportation industry within the 
48 continuous states in August  1978 and August  1989. The results, summa- 
rized in tables 10.7 and  10.8, unambiguously contradict the standard model 
and reflect two simple facts. First, surprisingly few nonstop routes involving 
medium and large cities were discontinued.  Second, critics overlook the fact 
that millions  of people actually  live  in metropolitan  areas where new hubs 
were established;  the number of new nonstop hub-to-hub and hub-to-spoke 
routes from these new hubs greatly outnumber the small number of discontin- 
ued  nonstop  routes.  This new  model  is  shown in the  upper-right  frame of 
figure 10.1; deregulation allows new nonstop service from city A to new hub, 
H2, thus eliminating the circuitry of detouring via an old hub H 1  .28 
March 10,  1990, 73); “They built hub-and-spoke route systems . . . rather than a web of direct, 
non-stop flights” (The Economist, January 26, 1991,57);  there are “far fewer direct flights” (New 
York Times, January 2, 1991. Al); “Many travelers now must fly farther to reach a given destina- 
tion because of hub-and-spoke systems , , , yield can decline even though passengers are paying 
more for their tickets’’ (WallStreerJournal, April 19, 1990, BI). 
26.  The 4 percent figure is from correspondence to the author from Severin Borenstein, dated 
May 20, 1991, and is calculated from the Department of Transportation data base for the second 
quarter of 1986. 
27.  An exception is Borenstein (1991). to which we return below. 
28.  The ability of  deregulation to open up new nonstop routes bypassing traditional hubs was 
recognized immediately by  perceptive observers, whereas previously, for instance, “everyone in 389  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
Table 10.7  Effect of Deregulation on Nonstop Domestic Air Service, Top 500 
Origin-Destination Markets, August 1978 and August 1989 
1978  1989 
Routes  Flights  Routes  Flights 
Flown both years: 
Hub to hub’  71 
Hub to nonhub  187 
Total  329 
Hub to hub  1 
Hub to nonhub  11 
Nonhub to nonhub  5 
Total  17 
Flown neither year:  93 
Nonhub to nonhub  -  71 













6  16 
47  123 
8  16 
61  155 
93  ... 
Source: O@cial Airline Guide, North American Edition, August 1,  1978, and August 1,  1989 
Note; The 500 top markets are ranked by  revenue passenger miles, from Department of  Trans- 
portation origin and destination survey, table 7, for the 12 months ending December 30, 1986. 
‘The hub airports include both the original hubs and new  hubs.  See the listing of  hubs in the 
notes to table 10.8. 
Some accounts treat hub-to-spoke routings as a byproduct of deregulation. 
However, on-line connections date back to the dawn of the airline age, and the 
first hub operations on today’s scale began when Chicago’s O’Hare airport 
terminal complex was opened in  1962.29  By the time deregulation occurred in 
1978, United at O’Hare, as well as Delta and Eastern at Atlanta, were ulreudy 
operating full-scale hubs, each with roughly 250 departures per day. Prior to 
deregulation passengers were forced to make connections, just as they  are 
today, but many more of those connections were interline rather than on-line, 
and more involved double connections. Between 1978 and 1989 interline con- 
nections fell by a factor of  10, from 41 percent of all connections to 4 percent 
(see table 10.10 below, sec. Id). 
When markets are ranked by passenger-miles, there are many long-haul 
markets that lacked nonstop service in both  1978 and 1989, but many  more 
that gained service than lost service.3o  This contrast is shown in table  10.7, 
which  provides a  decomposition of  nonstop routes served  in the  top  500 
origin-destination markets (accounting for 60 percent of  traffic  measured by 
the Carolinas or Virginias had to change planes to get beyond Atlanta or New York” (Baumgarner 
1979,47). 
29.  This statement is supported by the American Airlines annual report for 1983, which reports 
that the opening of Chicago’s O’Hare terminal in  1962 represented the initiation of  American’s 
first “true hub” (8). 
30.  Here it is important that markets be ranked by  origin and destination passengers, i.e., the 
city pairs where people actually want to travel, and not by enplaned passengers on particular city- 
pair segments, which of course respond to where the flights are actually operated. Table 10.8  Effect of Deregulation on Nonstop Domestic Air Service, AIL  Markets, August 1978 and August 1989 
1978  1989  Change  Frequency* 
Routes  Flights  Routes  Flights  Routes  Flights  1978  1989 
1. Original hubs: 
a. To original hubst 
b. To new hubs 
c. To large nonhubs 
d. To small nonhubs 
e.  Total 
2. New hubs: 
a. To new hubs' 
b. To large nonhubs 
c. To small nonhubs 
d. Total 
3. Large nonhubs: 
To large nonhubst 
a. Served both 
b. Not other year 
To small nonhubs: 
c. Served both 



















815(0)  97 
610( 10)  166 
2018(90)  468 
497(630)  358 
3940(730)  1089 
91(18)  55 
467(39)  350 
53( 138)  20s 
61 1  (195)  610 
653(58)  175 
73(3)  61 
162(216)  118 
108(  150)  -  44 
996(427)  398 
944~ 
1068(23) 
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-  142(885) 
82  I( 1097) 
164(51) 
796(245) 
134(53  1) 
1094(827) 
-  45(3 10) 
50(41) 
-  44( 162) 
-  82( -  30) 
-  121(483) 
8.7  9.7 
5.4  6.6 
5.4  5.7 
4-0  -  5.2 
5.3  6.0 
3.8  6.0 
3.5  4.4 
3.4  4.5 
-  3.0  42 
4.0  5.6 
1.7  2.8 
3.2  4.4 
2.0 
2.6  4.0 
- 4. Between small nonhub:’.’ 
a. Served both years  139  132( 143)  139  47(353)  0  -85(210)  2.0  2.9 
c. Total  304  192(425)  189  W446)  -  115  -  128(21)  2.0  2.7 
a. All hubs  1233  5 l61(935)  1865  7534(2852)  632  2373(  1937)  4.9  5.6 
b. Large nonhubs  lo00  3479(556)  1215  4532(1051)  215  105 3(495)  4.0  4.6 
c. Small nonhubs  647  742( 1 193)  752  606(2630)  105  -  136( 1437)  3.0  4.3 
b. Not other year  165  60(282)  2  170-  -  115  -43(-189)  2-1  2.2 
5. Summary:$ 
Source: Oficiul Airline Guide, Norrh American Edirion, August 1, 1978, and August  1, 1989. 
Nores: First-listed count of flights is for jets, subsequent count in parentheses is for turboprops. The listing of  routes and flights in this table includes 
only airports in the 48 continuous states and excludes all service from these airports to Alaska, Hawaii, or foreign countries. Every route and flight 
is included, except as indicated  in  note c, and except  among cities too small to be classified as “small  nonhubs.” Flight  totals  ignore weekend 
exceptions; a flight is counted as one daily frequency if it operates four or more days per week. 
Dejinirions: (1) Hubs:  Hub airports include all those in which at least one airline operated a substantial number of  on-line connecting flights in  1989. 
New hubs are those  in which one or more airlines performed a hub operation in  1989 but not  1978  and include Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago 
Midway, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit,  Nashville,  Newark,  Philadelphia,  Phoenix, Raleigh-Durham,  Salt Lake City,  and Washington Dulles.  The 
remaining hubs are classified as original hubs and include Atlanta, Chicago O’Hare, Cleveland, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, 
Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh,  St. Louis, and Washington National. (2) Size: Small nonhubs had nonstop service to no 
more than two hubs (new or original) in at least one year but had nonstop service to at least one hub in at least one year. Any airport with more than 
two routes to a hub in one or both years is classified as a large nonhub; airports with no routes to any hub in either year are excluded. Major airports 
classified as large nonhubs include Boston, Buffalo, Columbus, Oh., Indianapolis,  N.Y.  LaGuardia, N.Y. Kennedy, Orlando, San Diego, Seattle, 
and Tampa. 
*“Frequency” indicates total flights per route per day, including both jets and turboprops. 
‘Routes and flights between airports within a single category are adjusted to eliminate double counting. 
*The listing for flights between small nonhubs is based on a 50 percent sample (all cities with names beginning “A” through “L”, which account for 
49 percent of the pages listing flights in both the 1978 and 1989 source). 
§Summary totals are not adjusted to eliminate double counting; hence the total of routes and flights in section 5 is greater than the sum of routes and 
flights in sections 1-4,  inclusive. 392  Robert J. Gordon 
passenger-miles). Fully 422 of  the 500 top markets show no change in  the 
status of service, in that routes were either served nonstop or not in both years. 
In the remaining 78 markets, those adding nonstop service outnumbered those 
losing nonstop service by a margin of 61  to 17. Average frequencies (flights 
per day) in the discontinued markets were just 1.5,  but were 2.5 in the markets 
adding service. Further, many 1978 nonstop markets were served sparsely, so 
that many passengers were forced to make stops or connect if they did not 
want to travel at the time of a single nonstop (e.g., nonstop service from Bos- 
ton to Dallas increased from a single nonstop in 1978 to 9 per day in  1989). 
Critics, including Dempsey, imply that nonhub cities on the periphery of the 
48 states have suffered particularly severe declines in nonstop ser~ice.~’  Tak- 
ing as examples Boston, San Diego, and Seattle, nonstop routes from these 
three major cities to the other 24 of  the top 25 largest metropolitan areas in- 
creased from 44 in 1978 to 56 in 1989 (out of a possible of 72). 
The complete census of domestic airline routes and flights appears in table 
10.8. Airports are divided among four categories: original hubs, new hubs, 
large nonhubs, and small nonhub~.~~  The number of routes served increased 
not only in  every category involving hubs but also in  routes between large 
nonhubs. Taking the categories in table 10.8 from line la  through 3b, which 
account for 90 percent of flights in  1978,33  the number of routes served in- 
creases by 45 percent, the number of jet flights by 36 percent, and the number 
of turboprop flights by 229 percent. 
The bottom part of table  10.8 (lines 3c-4b)  displays a sharp contrast be- 
tween the 90 percent of flights on major routes and the remaining 10 percent 
of  flights involving service between small nonhubs and other (small and large) 
nonhubs, where the number of routes flown decreased by 36 percent, and the 
number of jet flights decreased by 55 percent; the number of turboprop flights 
increased by 37 percent. A graphical interpretation of this shift is provided in 
the bottom frame of figure 10.1. Many of the abandoned flights to small cities 
were along linear routes  dictated  by  regulated routes,  as in  the abandoned 
3  1.  Indeed  Dempsey’s  prime  example  of  circuitry  involves  “the  loss  of  pre-deregulation 
Boston-San Francisco nonstops” (30). This is one of Dempsey’s many factual errors: in no year 
since 1962 has Boston-San Francisco lacked nonstops, and in the summer of  1991 enjoyed five 
daily nonstop flights. His fanciful “circuitry” example involves passengers allegedly forced to fly 
this route via Dallas, rather than more directly through any of the many available hubs, including 
Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Minneapolis, Newark, or Salt Lake City. 
32.  My  definition of  a hub is based on the absolute volume of connecting flight and traffic 
activity, not  the percentage of  total traffic  that is connecting vs.  local (an alternative criterion 
suggested to me by Severin Borenstein). For instance, San Francisco and Memphis in  1989:Q3 
were ranked 15th and 16th in the absolute volume of connecting passenger enplanements, yet San 
Francisco boarded only 21 percent of  its total domestic traffic as connections (79 percent local 
traffic); Memphis boarded 63 percent as connections (37 percent local) This contrast does not 
make San Francisco any less of a hub than Memphis, because the volume of activity is the same, 
and the dominant connecting airline in San Francisco (United) gains a tremendous advantage in 
adding flight frequencies that allow it to dominate the local traffic as well. 
33.  When a turboprop flight is given a weight equal to 0.25 of a jet flight, the 1978 flights listed 
in lines la  through 3b account for 89.3 percent of the total flights listed in lines la  through 4b. 393  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
route between C and D. Because most of these routes were shorter than 200 
miles in length, they were valued by relatively few passengers, most of whom 
used  surface  More  than  offsetting  the  loss of  such  routes  was 
(1) the large number of new routes to hubs (e.g.,  from C to H1 and  H2), 
(2) the large number of local passengers served on new routes than abandoned 
routes (because hubs like HI and H2 on average have much larger populations 
than small cities like D), (3) the greatly increased number of connection op- 
portunities from travel beyond hubs, thus allowing many two-connection trips 
to be reduced to a single connection, and (4)  the much greater daily frequency 
of service on added routes than on abandoned routes.35 
Overall, it appears that the benefits to small nonhub cities of  added flights 
to hubs outweigh the loss of direct nonstop flights, as the number of routes 
flown from small nonhubs increased by  16 percent,  and the total number of 
flights increased by 67 percent  (table 10.8, line 5c). The only remaining as- 
pect of the indictment of deregulation by Dempsey and others that retains its 
validity is the shift from jet to turboprop aircraft. Yet even here the discomfort 
factor is minimal; as most of the flights involved are less than an hour, discom- 
fort is partly offset by increased frequency.  36 
Despite the widespread introduction of new nonstop routes and the virtual 
elimination of  interline connections under deregulation,  the fraction of  trips 
involving connections  actually rose slightly, from 27 percent  in  1978 to 33 
percent  in  1989 (table  10.10 below, line  Id). Thus, in view of  new nonstop 
route opportunities,  the remaining debate over hubbing remains whether pas- 
sengers were forced to take the extra connections or voluntarily chose to take 
the extra connections that accounted for the 1978-89  increase of 6 percentage 
points in the fraction of trips involving connections. 
The forced interpretation argues that the total number of flights involving 
large nonhubs increased by only  33 percent  between  1978 and  1989 (table 
10.8, line 5b, weighting turboprops as 0.25 of a jet flight); domestic passen- 
ger enplanements increased by 67 percent. The implication is that the unavail- 
ability of seats on heavily booked nonstop flights forced demand to spill over 
to less desirable connections. Denying this interpretation, however, is the fact 
34.  Of the 123 abandoned nonstop routes between large and small nonhubs (table 10.10, line 
3d), 62 percent were 200 miles or less. 
35.  The average daily frequency on flights from hubs to small nonhubs (table 10.10, lines Id 
and 2c) in  1989 was 4.8, as contrasted with 2.1 on the abandoned 1978 routes involving small 
nonhubs (lines 3d and 4b). 
36.  We  can tie our study of  airline routes back to the findings of  CCT (1984) that there are 
economies of scale to increased density (traffic per number of cities served) but not from an exten- 
sion of the number of cities served. For the system as a whole, increased traffic between 1978 and 
1989 was not accompanied by  an  increase in  the number of  points served, and hence density 
increased. But the CCT results refer to individual carriers, and most carriers increased the number 
of points served, implying that each airport had more carriers in 1989 than 1978. The CCT results 
for economies of  scale for individual carriers cannot be applied to the system as a whole without 
a carrier-by-carrier study to determine whether increased traffic offset the increase in the number 
of  points served by each carrier. 394  Robert J. Gordon 
that long-haul nonstop flights were not significantly more or less crowded than 
average flights before or after dereg~lation.~~ 
Instead, the choice interpretation suggests at least four reasons why travel- 
ers opted voluntarily for connections instead of  same-plane service: The first 
two reasons take note of a flaw in the data on the percentage of trips involving 
change of  plane-these  neither distinguish same-plane flights making  no 
stops, one stop, or multistops, nor  do they distinguish single from double 
connections. Thus the first reason for voluntary choice of  connections after 
deregulation is that a significant fraction of the same-plane 1978 traffic did not 
operate nonstop but involved one, two, or more stops. Much of  this one or 
multistop traffic has been replaced by  connections that are usually as fast and 
available at much greater frequency. Second, the proliferation of new hubs has 
greatly  reduced not  only the  number  of  interline connections as is  docu- 
mented, but also the number of time-consuming double  connection^.^^ Third, 
the greatly increased number of long-haul connection opportunities involving 
satellite airports (e.g., Oakland, Orange County, San Jose, White Plains, Is- 
lip) diverted traffic from the traditional nonstop flights (still routed from air- 
ports like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New  York Kennedy); passengers 
chose connections from nearby satellite airports voluntarily to save ground 
travel time, pay lower parking fees, and reduce congestion delay. Fourth, pas- 
sengers may choose voluntarily to take the time penalty of  a connection in 
order to build up frequent-flyer credits on a preferred carrier; revealed prefer- 
ence argues that this cost is more than offset by the benefits of frequent-flyer 
programs. Overall, we conclude that the forced diversion of traffic from over- 
crowded nonstops to connecting flights was minor compared to the diversion 
from one-stops to connections (involving a negligible time cost), to the bene- 
fits of reduced double connections, to the saving in ground time and conges- 
tion when travelers chose alternative smaller airports, and to the perceived 
benefits of frequent-flyer plans. 
10.3.3  Output Quality: Other Aspects 
The popular literature on deregulation implies that there has been a wide- 
spread and unambiguous decline in the quality of airline service as a result of 
37.  Taking the nine most important transcontinental nonstop routes flown by American, TWA, 
and United, the weighted average load factor in October,  1977 was 58.1 percent, compared to 
domestic system load factors for the same three carriers of 60.5 percent. In October,  1989, the 
figures were 66.5 and 63.3 percent, respectively. The source is the author’s calculations from CAB 
and Department of Transportation market segment data. 
38.  Of the hundreds of examples that could be constructed from the sources used in tables 10.7 
and  10.8, the first two  I looked up will  suffice. Travel from Portland,  Maine,  to Anchorage, 
Alaska, in July, 1978 involved a single early-morning option to take a double connection involv- 
ing three airlines; in July,  1989 the same trip could be taken in mid-morning or mid-afternoon 
through a single connection involving a single airline, with an elapsed time shorter by 2 hours and 
45 minutes. Travel from Bakersfield, California, to Savannah, Georgia, could be made twice daily 
in either  year, by  double connection  involving two airlines in  1978 and by  single connection 
involving a single airline in the other; the time saving in  1989 was only 15 minutes for an early 
morning trip but 2 hours for a midday trip. 395  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
airline dereg~lation.~~  This section assembles in table 10.9 a variety of  indi- 
cators to provide a new evaluation. 
(I)  On-time performance. Since September 1987, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) has compiled a data base of  on-time performance by 
carrier, flight, and airport, and these data are widely publicized. Shown in the 
second column of table 10.9, line 1, is the average percentage of flights arriv- 
ing within 15 minutes for the three years ending in August 1990. It is less well 
known that comparable data (covering only the top 200 markets) were col- 
lected prior to 1981, and the 1977-78  average is also displayed on the same 
line of table 10.9. Perhaps surprisingly, the percentages are almost identical, 
indicating no deterioration in on-time performance. 
(2) Scheduledjight times. How could the airlines have maintained a con- 
stant  on-time record,  in  view  of  the  frequent criticism that  deregulation- 
inspired hubbing has increased congestion and led to long conga lines of air- 
craft waiting to take off? The answer is provided on line 2 of table 10.9, which 
shows that airlines have extended scheduled times in order to maintain their 
average on-time percentage. Our sample consists of 60 routes flown in both 
years, with a representative selection of routes from original hubs, new hubs, 
and large nonhubs, and most of the heavily congested airports are included. 
The sample covers roughly 5 percent of  the comparable routes in each year 
and shows that flight times were extended by  roughly 10 minutes regardless 
of  distance, implying that ground congestion was the cause.4o  However, the 
increase in flight times is uniform across airport types and shows no tendency 
to be greater in hubs than nonhubs. Hence the underlying culprit is more likely 
to be the growth in air traffic relative to air traffic control capacity rather than 
any effect of deregulation on route patterns. 
(3)  Service complaints. Line 3 of table 10.9 shows a surprising decline in 
airline service complaints, indicating either an improvement in airline service 
or a reduction in the “propensity to complain.” It is unlikely that the source of 
this  change  is  selection  bias  resulting  from  a  change  in  the  complaint- 
receiving agency from the CAB to the Department of Transportation, as the 
Department of Transportation telephone number has been widely publicized 
and in fact complaints exhibited a temporary 1987 hump as a result of airline 
 merger^.^' 
(4)  Safety. The fatality rate has dropped markedly, and this appears to be the 
result of coordinated efforts by  aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and govern- 
ment safety regulation, rather than a by-product of  deregulation. As of early 
1991, more passengers had  survived than died in the six fatal crashes that 
occurred over the three previous years. During that period 72 percent of pas- 
39.  A particularly vivid indictment is provided by Charles Kuralt (1990). 
40. In August 1978, the sample includes 249 flights of the 4,727 jet flights (5.3 percent) among 
the airports other than small nonhubs. In August, the sample includes 296 flights of the 6,655 jet 
flights (4.5 percent) within the same category. 
41. Complaints fell from  41,560 to  16,668 despite  an  increase in  enplaned passengers of 
roughly 80 percent. 396  Robert J. Gordon 
Table 10.9  Aspects of Airline Service Quality, Selected Indicators, Averages for 
1977-1978and 1988-1989 
Change 
Average,  Average,  1988-89 - 
1977-78  1988-89  1977-78 
1. Percentage of  flights on time (within 15 minutes)  76.8  77.9  1.1 
2. Elapsed scheduled time (hours:minutes): 
1. 20 short-haul routes  1  :07  1:15  0:08 
b. 20 medium-haul routes  2:05  2:19  0:14 
c. 20 long-haul routes  4:08  4:18  0:  10 
d. Average for 60 routes  2:27  2:37  0:  10 
3. Complaint rate per 100,000 passengers enplaned  8.03  1.84  -6.19 
4. Fatalities per 100,000 passengers enplaned  0.17  0.06  -0.14 
Sources by line: (1) 1977-78  on-time percentage refers to top 200 markets;  1988-89  on-time 
percentage for all reported airports is for the 36 months from the beginning of the current data 
base in September 1987 through August 1990. Source for September 1987 through January 1990 
is U.S.  Department of  Transportation, Office of  Consumer Affairs, Air Travel Consumer Report, 
March  1990. Otherwise  the source is Air  Transport World, “facts and figures” page, various 
issues. (2) Times are for August  1978 and August 1989 and the source is the same as for table 
10.8. Short-haul routes are 300-400  miles, medium-haul 700-800  miles, and long-haul routes 
1500 miles and over. Of the 20 routes in each category, 8 are randomly selected among those 
from “original hubs” (as defined in the notes to table 10.8),  5 from “new hubs,” and 7 from “large 
nonhubs.” Of  the most congested airports, Atlanta, O’Hare, Denver, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Los An- 
geles, and N.Y.  Kennedy are all included. (3) Same sources as line  1, the average for the years 
1977-78,  and for the 24 months ending November 1990. (4) Fatalities for 1977-78,  Statistical 
Abstract,  1982-83,  table  1102, 635, and enplanements,  table  1099, 633. Fatalities for 1988, 
Statistical Abstract, 1990, table 1066, 622 and for 1989 from New York Times, January 19, 1991, 
A14. 1988-89 enplanements are from Aviation Daily, various issues. 
sengers in  airline accidents survived, as compared to only 10 percent during 
the period 1980-87  (Phillips 1991). Also suggesting that deregulation had no 
adverse effect, Rose (1990) shows that the average accident rate was virtually 
the same in 1976-80  and 1981-86  and that this rate has declined by  a factor 
of five since 1957-60. 
(5)  Seating density. There is no more obvious source of discontent with air 
travel than the cramped dimensions of  seats in present-day commercial air- 
craft. Although an  increase in seating density has occurred, its timing ante- 
dates deregulation. Seats per plane for the Boeing 747 increased by  18 percent 
between  1972 and  1977 and by  8 percent between  1977 and  1982 (Gordon 
1990a, table 4.8). The respective figures for the Boeing 727-200  were 7 per- 
cent and 9 percent. Rather than resulting from deregulation, higher seat den- 
sity resulted from an overexpansion of  airline capacity in the late 1960s and 
the timing of the airline design cycle, which led to the introduction in 1970- 
72 of overly large wide-bodied aircraft. Both seat density and load factor were 
temporarily depressed, and both increased as traffic recovered after 1975. 
(6)  Frequent-Jyer  beneJits. Morrison and Winston (1989, 83n.4) have es- 
timated that frequent-flyer benefits were worth 2.3 cents per passenger-mile 
in 1983, fully 20 percent of the average fare in that year, and there are good 397  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
reasons to view this figure as an undere~timate.~~  This represents an unmea- 
sured component of airline output, in the sense that the true price of  travel is 
overstated.  Some portion of unmeasured  output may be offset by free travel 
that is counted as part of revenue-passenger-mile  output. But apparently such 
travel is not consistently  counted in measured  output, leaving a substantial 
residual  of  unmeasured  Further,  as long  as there  is  an inventory 
of unused miles, previous travel has created a consumer asset of  substantial 
present  value.  To  value  frequent-flyer  benefits,  we  take  the  conservative 
Morrison-Winston estimate of a 20 percent discount and assume that one-third 
of award miles are claimed, one-third are held for future use, and one-third 
expire without use. If one-half of claimed miles are counted as revenue traffic, 
then the remaining unmeasured component of  output is one-sixth for claimed 
miles and one-third for unused miles, or half the 20 percent discount figure. 
This implies a downward bias in output estimates of about 1 percent per year 
over the ten years since frequent-flyer programs began in early 1981. 
10.3.4  The Value of Time 
By far the most important unmeasured quality attribute of airline output is 
the value of time saved by airline travelers, as compared to alternative means 
of transportation. However, the invention of aviation, and the increased speed 
of aircraft from the beginning of the industry through the late 1960s, should 
be credited to the airframe and engine manufacturers rather than to the airline 
industry.  Unmeasured  quality  change in airline output refers  to changes in 
elapsed  time caused by changes in airline operations  with a given fleet of 
aircraft. Here we focus on such changes between  1978 and 1989 and return at 
the end of this section to the value of time achieved by the aircraft manufac- 
turing industry. 
Morrison and Winston (1989, table 2, 66) have estimated a disaggregated 
airline carrier choice model that yields dollar values of time saving in three 
categories for 1983, total travel time ($34), transit time ($74), and schedule 
delay time ($3).  Using these estimates, we calculate in table 10.10 the time 
42. The existence in the mid-1980s of a broker market for frequent-flyer awards (recently shut 
down by aggressive airline court actions) provides a market test for valuation. I paid in the range 
of $0.025 to $0.04 per mile for such awards in the period 1983-86,  yet this figure understates the 
value to the traveler who earned the free mileage, because of innumerable bonuses (double miles, 
triple  miles,  loyalty  awards,  affinity  credit cards, etc.).  In my  case, in  the first  ten years of 
frequent-flyer programs  I  was credited with  1.463 million frequent-flyer miles for only 0.836 
million miles actually flown, for a payoff ratio of  1.75, and an estimated value of bonus miles in 
the range of  $0.04 to $0.05 per mile actually flown. For  instance,  in  one example by  flying 
100,000 miles I earned enough bonuses for a 175,000 certificate, good for two round-trip first 
class tickets to Australia, with a retail value of $1  1,oOO.  and which I valued at $4,750 ($2,500 for 
the cheapest coach fare, $25 per hour per person for 35 hours in the first-class instead of economy 
cabin, and $500 for the included hotel and car rental certificates), or at $0.0475 per mile flown to 
win the award. 
43.  Severin Borenstein has written me that “frequent flyer plan bonus trips have not been con- 
sistently reported as revenue passenger miles by the airlines, though the Department of Transpor- 
tation is now starting to enforce a consistent reporting method for these trips.” 398  Robert J. Gordon 
value of shifts in routing patterns,  as well as extended travel times on given 
flights. Because of the low estimated value of  schedule delay time, we can 
neglect the difficult calculation of the value of increased flight frequency on 
given routes. 
All  counts  of  flights  in  table  10.10 are  taken  from  table  10.8 and  are 
weighted, with respective weights of 1  .O for jet flights and 0.25 for turboprop 
flights.  Line  lc shows that 21 percent of  1989 flights were on new routes. 
Despite this, line 2 shows that total  connecting traffic increased  somewhat 
from 27 percent to 33 percent of total trips, and interline connections almost 
disappeared.  We  have argued above that this small shift to connections, de- 
spite  increased  nonstop  routings  available,  mainly  reflect consumer  choice 
rather than forced diversion from overcrowded nonstop flights. 
To  place a time value on these shifts, we use the Morrison-Winston esti- 
mates of the value of time, updated from 1983 to 1989 using aggregate com- 
pensation  per  hour,  and  make  plausible  estimates of  the  elapsed  times  in- 
volved in different types of flights. The resulting estimates, shown in section 
4 of the table, show that the direct benefits of changes in flight routings add 
up to a small $1.5 billion,  more than offset by the cost of  lengthened  flight 
times. The resulting time cost is about 4 percent of domestic airline passenger 
revenue in 1989, with the implication that measured output growth from 1978 
to 1989 is overstated by roughly 0.3 percent per annum. 
The estimates in table 10.10 are trivial in size, however, in contrast to plau- 
sible estimates of the value of  time saving achieved by the aircraft manufac- 
turing  industry. Our calculations of standardized seat miles,  summarized in 
table 10.12 below, show that average elapsed block speed increased from 210 
miles per hour in 1954 to 433 miles per hour in 1972, and then remained at 
this level through 1987. This implies that the average 1989 trip of 2:37 hours 
(table  10.9, line 2d) would  have taken  5:24 hours in  1954, neglecting  the 
greater number of enroute stops in  1954. The time saving in  1989 was worth 
$5 1.7 billion, or 116 percent of domestic airline passenger revenue.M 
The value of time saving from faster aircraft is just the tip of the iceberg, 
because it neglects the value of time saved when traffic shifts from surface to 
air transport. If  we assume that intercity common carrier passenger-miles  per 
dollar of real disposable income remained constant between  1939 and  1989, 
hypothetical  air travel  would  have been  52 percent  of  the  actual  amount.45 
(The remaining 48 percent represents some combination of an income elastic- 
ity for travel greater than unity and an increased  demand for travel resulting 
from the new-product aspects of air travel). Taking an average 1989 domestic 
44. If we take a more conservative approach and use the Morrison-Winston value of elapsed 
time for the half of air traffic that represents business travel, and use aggregate compensation per 
hour for the other half, the time saving falls to $35.4 billion. 
45.  1939 intercity traffic from James (1982, table  1-3,  xxviii); 1989/1939 real disposable in- 
come equals 5.8, from 1990 Economic Report ojrhe President, table C-27. 1989 intercity travel 
includes bus, rail, and air, and the share for air was 92 percent.  Resulting hypothetical  1989 
intercity traffic is  197.2 billion revenue passenger miles, of  which 27.5 actually traveled by  sur- 
face, leaving 169.7 as the amount shifting from surface to air. 399  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
Table 10.10  Changes in Value of llme in Domestic Air navel, 1978 to 1989 
1978  1989 
1.  Allocation of flights (weighted by aircraft size): 
a. Total flights  6183  845  1 
b. Flights on new routes  I789 
21 
a. Interline  11  1 
b. On-line  16  32 
7 
c. Flights on new routes (96) 
2.  Connecting flights (%):  27  33 
3. Shifts in type of flight (%): 
a. Single interline to single on-line connections 
b. Double interline to single on-line connec- 
c. One-stop no-plane-change to single on-line 
d. Nonstop flights to single on-line connections 
a. Interline to on-line connections 
b. One-stop no-plane-change to single on-line 
c. Nonstop flights to single on-line connections 








-  1.5 
-3.1 
-  1.6 
~ 
1989 domestic airline passenger revenue (%)  -4 
Sources by line: (la)  Table 10.8, totals of lines la  through 4b, with jet flights weighted 1.0  and 
turboprops weighted 0.25 (lb).  Flights on new routes are calculated by taking the number of  new 
routes in each category of table 10.8  and estimating the frequency per route as the average of the 
1978 and 1989 frequency within that category. 'hrboprop weights are applied as in line la. (lc) 
lblla. (2,2a,  2b) Borenstein (1991, tables 3 and 4), which refers to 1978:Q2 and 1990:Q2. Data 
for the first period are copied by Borenstein from Bailey-Graham-Kaplan (1985, table 4.6, 86) 
and for the second period are calculated by  Borenstein from the Department of Transportation 
data base. (3a, 3b) Interline to online is divided arbitrarily by a 7-3 ratio between double interline 
and single-interline connections. (3c, 3d)  The remaining shift to on-line connections is assumed 
to have been diverted equally from one-stop and nonstop flights. (4a-4c) Domestic passenger 
enplanements for  1988 from Statistical  Abstract  1990, table  1065, 628, multiplied by  0.67 to 
eliminate double counting for connections. Value of  time for 1983 from Momson-Winston (1989, 
table 2, 66), extrapolated to  1989 by  business sector compensation per hour.  Respective total 
travel times and transit travel times saved are, respectively, 2.0 and  1.5 for double interline to 
single on-line, 0.5 and 0.5 hours for single interline to single on-line, -0.25  and  -0.25  for 
one-stop no change of plane to single on-line connection, and -  2.0 and -  1  .O for nonstop to 
single on-line connection. (4d) Extra travel time 0.167 hours from table 9, line 2d.  Rest of 
calculation uses same sources as (4a-4c). 
airline trip of 791 miles and the elapsed times of 2:37 hours for air (from table 
10.9) and 14 hours by surface, the implied time saving for the traffic shifting 
from surface to air was worth $6 1.5  billion  .46 
There remains the 48 percent of  1989 air travel that represents a combina- 
46.  The 14-hour surface speed is calculated as 794 miles divided by  65 miles per hour (inter- 
state highway speed), which allows about  1.8 hours for rest and  meal  stops.  By contrast,  the 
fastest 1940 scheduled train between New York and Chicago took 17 hours (James 1982, xxvi). 400  Robert J. Gordon 
tion of  a nonunitary  income elasticity and a new  If, for instance, 
the income elasticity of travel demand with respect to real income per capita 
is 1.5, then this 48 percent can be divided into 16 percent for the income effect 
and 32 percent for the new-product effect. Usher (1964) interprets an inven- 
tion as a shift from a one-dimensional to two-dimensional production possi- 
bility frontier and evaluates the social welfare created by the extra dimension 
as the  distance  between  the  new  frontier  and  the  community  indifference 
curve, but his approach cannot be implemented empirically without knowl- 
edge of the slopes and intercepts of the frontier and indifference curve. A more 
practical approach for estimation is to interpret the demand for the new prod- 
uct of air travel as resulting from a decline in the total cost of travel, consisting 
of  the money price  plus the  value of  time.  A demand curve can be  drawn 
through  two points:  The first is the actual  1989 total cost of an average trip 
($185) and the average quantity (416 million passengers). The second is the 
hypothetical 1989 total cost of the assumed surface speed ($531) and the hy- 
pothetical  quantity  (the actual quantity less the  32 percent new-product  de- 
mand, or 283 million).48 The implied consumer surplus trapezoid  is $120.9 
billion. 
Overall,  we can sum the  value of time  saved from shifted  traffic ($61.5 
billion) to the new-product value ($120.9 billion), to arrive at a total of $182.4 
billion, which is 408 percent of  1989 domestic passenger revenue, or, alter- 
natively, 3.5 percent  of  1989 GNP. We  cannot include the  value of the in- 
creased speed of  aircraft from  1954 to  1989, because this  would represent 
double counting.  Our estimate is conservative, because it applies only to the 
domestic, but not the international,  portion of the U.S. airline industry. Bal- 
ancing this is the likelihood that,  in the absence of  air travel,  surface travel 
speeds would have  increased  by  investment in an American version  of the 
French high-speed train or Japanese bullet train. Whatever its size, this type 
saving should be credited to the aircraft manufacturing industry  and is about 
10 times as large as U.S. commercial aircraft sales in  1988, a number that 
would be even larger if the saving of time in international travel by U.S. and 
foreign airlines were included,  implying a huge rate of return to research  in 
the aircraft industry, at least through the early 1970s. 
10.3.5  Input Quantity and Quality 
We have previously in part 10.1 discussed alternative estimates of the quan- 
tity of  labor input. Our primary  concern here is the measurement  of  capital 
47.  Severin Borenstein (in correspondence) cites a third source, the introduction of price dis- 
crimination under the deregulated regime, because he suspects that  low discount fares have in- 
creased leisure travel by  more than high undiscounted fares have reduced business travel. Thus 
some unknown part of our “new product” measure may be attributable to deregulation. 
48. The 1989 actual cost is the average fare per passenger ($107) plus a time cost of $29.80 
(the average of the Morrison-Winston estimate for elapsed travel time and compensation per hour) 
times 2.6 hours per trip, or a total of $184.50. The 1989 hypothetical surface cost is $184.50 plus 
$29.80 times the hypothetical extra time of  1 I .6 hours, or $530.20. 401  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
input, although in our MFP calculations we  also make allowance for energy 
and materials input, and expenditures by the government on air traffic control. 
Our aim here is to develop alternative measures of  MFP growth that corre- 
spond to different capital goods deflators, in order to determine whether im- 
proved measurement of the quality of capital goods can explain some or all of 
the changes in ALP growth over time in the transportation sector. 
Much analysis of transportation productivity treats capital as a fixed factor 
of production (Good, Nadiri, and Sickles 1989, 3-4).  However it would be a 
mistake to impose too sharply the dichotomy that the manufacturing sector 
produces aircraft on purely technical considerations and to search for effects 
of deregulation only in the MFP residual that remains after the effect of capital 
quantity and quality is subtracted out. The quantity of  service that a given 
aircraft can provide is determined not just by  the manufacturer but also by 
utilization. Airlines can boost the capital services provided by a given aircraft 
fleet in three ways; by increasing the fraction of seats filled (load factor), by 
increasing the utilization of  the fleet measured in hours per day or year, and 
by increasing seating density. 
In addition to affecting the ratio of capital services to aircraft characteris- 
tics, the regulatory regime feeds back to the aircraft design process itself. The 
mileage-based fares in the regulated era were originally based on competition 
with first-class rail travel, where the relation of per-mile cost to length of haul 
was much flatter than for airlines. As a result there was heavy cross subsidi- 
zation of  short-haul by  long-haul travel. Gellman (1968) has argued that the 
highly inefficient DC-7, the last of  the piston-era aircraft and the first plane 
designed to fly coast to coast nonstop, would not have been created without 
the overpricing of  long-haul travel.  Similarly, the wide-bodied jet  aircraft 
(B747, DClO, and LlOll)  introduced in 1970-72 might have taken a different 
form, or have been ordered in fewer numbers by domestic carriers, had it not 
been for long-haul overpricing. In turn, the effect of deregulation in sharply 
increasing short-haul fares relative to long-haul fares, together with the eco- 
nomics of hub operations, have stimulated the demand for short-haul airliners 
like the B737. 
The first concept of capital input is the real stock series developed by  the 
BEA, using the same deflators for structures and equipment as in the NIPA 
accounts. The BEA capital measurement project provides a breakdown that is 
perfectly designed for the purpose of  this study, including real and nominal 
investment flows and capital stocks for both structures and equipment in total 
transportation and in the three subsectors covered in this paper.49 
For air transport two alternative capital input series are developed for com- 
parison with the BEA. One takes the new aircraft deflator developed in my 
price measurement project (Gordon 1990a) and combines it with my automo- 
49.  All  BEA  investment and  capital  stock data used in this paper are taken  from the  latest 
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bile deflator as a proxy for ground equipment to form an alternative series for 
equipment. Because I have not  developed  an  alternative deflator for struc- 
tures,  the  alternative  equipment series  is combined with  the existing  BEA 
deflator for airline structures  (which represents  5 percent or less of  airline 
capital). By taking into account improvements in both performance and oper- 
ating efficiency, my aircraft deflator declines relative to the BEA deflator by a 
factor of  10 and by somewhat less once ground equipment and structures are 
included. 
In order to assess the relative importance of  improvements in performance 
as compared to improvements in efficiency, a second capital input series mea- 
sures the standardized  available seat mile (ASM) capacity of the industry’s 
aircraft fleet.  Each of  35 different aircraft types  is described by  a standard 
number of  seats, speed, and yearly utilization,  and the total is aggregated by 
the actual number of  each aircraft type in the fleet in each year. This measure 
of  capacity differs from actual output in response to any divergence between 
actual and standard seats, speed, and utilization. 
In comparing new models of  aircraft with the comparable older models that 
they replace, the standardized ASM measure always yields a smaller valuation 
of the quality of the new  model compared to the old than is yielded by my 
estimate of  net revenue or by  a comparison of  used aircraft prices, simply 
because it adjusts only for the increased size and speed of newer models, but 
not (as do the net revenue and used price ratios) for improved fuel efficiency 
and for the reduced number of pilots required by some types of newer aircraft. 
Table 10.11 shows eight examples of the 15 comparisons used to develop my 
aircraft price index. These eight examples cover 14 of  the 35 aircraft types 
used to compute standardized ASMs. For each comparison, column (3)  lists 
the ratio of the sales price of the new to the old model (in the overlap year, if 
any, or else in the first year of production of the new model and last year of 
production  of  the old model).50 Column (4) shows  standardized  ASMs  for 
each comparison and indicates that the ASM ratio was smaller than the price 
ratio in six cases of eight, suggesting that airlines would not have purchased 
the new models if they had offered no attractive attributes other than improved 
size and speed. The appeal of the newer models becomes clear in column (3, 
which  shows the ratio of  the  net revenue that  could  be generated  by  each 
model at the fixed input prices of a particular year, and in column (6),  which 
shows the ratio of the prices of the models in the used aircraft market in a 
particular year. 
The distinction between actual and standardized capacity provides an inter- 
esting decomposition  of the sources of improvement in aircraft performance 
over time, even if it fails to take into account improvements in the efficiency 
of labor and fuel use. As shown in the top part of  table 10.12, actual growth 
50. These are true  “buyers’ prices” copied from CAB records that  report the price of  each 
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Table 10.11  Comparisons of Selected New and Old Model Commercial Aircraft 
Sales  Standardized  Net  Used  Year for 
Price  ASM  Revenue  Price  columns 
Old Model  New Model  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio  Ratio  5 and 6 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
DC6-B  L188  1.73  1.47  3.37  2.86  1965 
L188  B727-100  2.67  1.82  1.80  4.10  1965 
DC7  DC8-50  2.61  2.86  20.57  19.20  1965 
cv440  DC9- 10  4.00  2.48  10.35  9.33  1965 
B707-3M)B  B747-100  2.99  3.55  4.97  6.00  1977 
DC8-61  LlOll  1.84  1.28  1.44  3.54  1977 
B727-200  MD80  1.70  1.02  3.07  3.01  1982 
LlOll  B767-200  1  .OO  0.79  0.78  . . .  1982 
Sources: Columns 1-3,  5-7  from Gordon (1990a), table 4.9, 137-39,  and table 4.13, 146. Col- 
umn 4: see notes for table 10.12. 
in  traffic largely paralleled growth in actual capacity, although there was a 
minor negative contribution of load factor in  1959-69,  which was reversed in 
1969-78.  The major contribution to capacity growth in the first and last peri- 
ods was the purchase of  additional planes; the most important factors were 
larger and faster planes in  1959-69,  the decade of transition from piston to 
jet, and larger planes in  1969-78,  the decade in which the wide-bodied air- 
craft were introduced. The pattern for standardized capacity was similar, in- 
dicating that  most changes in  average size and  speed were inherent in the 
products supplied by the manufacturing industry. 
Changes in the use of  standardized capacity were relatively minor. Actual 
seats per plane fell relative to standardized seats in the first period and then 
rose; this reflects in part the use of relatively large low-density first-class sec- 
tions on the first generation of jets, which were gradually reduced as a fraction 
of  total seats. Once the transition to jets was  complete, after 1969, the in- 
crease in seat density proceeded steadily, and there was no significant accel- 
eration after deregulation. The only visible effects of deregulation were a mi- 
nor increase in utilization (line 3d), and a slowdown in the growth of  plane 
size (line 2b) related to the shift to smaller aircraft suitable for hub-and-spoke 
operations. 
10.3.6  Growth in MFP 
The new results on changes in capital quality can now be used to compute 
alternative series of MFP growth for the full period 1948-87.  Each of the new 
MFP series uses the same input data on  fuel and  materials inputs, and an 
experimental series is calculated that allows for government input in the form 
of spending on airports and air traffic control. 
Table 10.13 provides growth rates of output and input for four time intervals 
and begins in section 1 with the two alternative equipment deflators (BEA and 404  Robert J. Gordon 
Table 10.12  Sources of Capacity Growth by Aircraft Characteristic 
(annual percentage growth rates) 
1954-59  1959-69  1969-78  1978-87 
1. Actual: 
a. Revenue passenger miles 
b. Load factor (Ic - la) 
c. Available seat miles 
d. Number of planes 
e. Seats per plane 
f. Speed (MPH) 
g.  Utilization (hours per year) 
a. Available seat miles 
b. Seats per plane 
c. Speed (MPH) 
d. Utilization (hours per year) 
3. Actual - standardized: 
a. Available seat miles 
b. Seats per plane 
c. Speed (MPH) 
d. Utilization (hours per year) 
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Sources by line: (la) Revenue passenger miles are from Aerospace  Facts and Figures,  various 
issues, for 1954-83  and from Air Carrier Trajic Statistics, December of various years, for the 
years 1984-88. (lb) Equals la  minus Ic. (lc)  Available seat miles are from Aerospace Facts and 
Figures,  1984185 for the years  1969-83  and from Air  Carrier Trajic Statistics, December of 
various years  for  1954-68  and  1984-88.  (Id) The number of  planes  is  a constructed  series 
aggregating models over the time period  1954-88.  The number of each model in use for each 
year is from the FAA Statistical Handbook of  Aviation, various years, and the World Jet Airplane 
lnventory at Year-End 1988 (Boeing 1989), sec. 3, table 5. (le)  Data for seating density are from 
the measure of available seats per aircraft mile from Aerospace Facts and Figures,  1984-85, for 
the years  1960-83 and Air Carrier Trajic Statistics, various years, for 1954-59  and 1984-88. 
(If) Average speed was constructed as a weighted average of the speed of U.S.  certificated air 
camers domestic and international operations, taken from the FAA  Statistical Handbook of  Avia- 
tion, various years, and the Statistical Abstract, various years. (lg) Data for total aircraft hours 
are revenue aircraft hours from Air Transport, various issues, for the years 1960-87  and the CAB 
Handbook of  Airline Statistics, 1963 ed. for 1954-59.  (2a-d) Standardized available seat miles 
were constructed by aggregating over airplane models using World Jet Airplane Inventory at Year- 
End  1988 (Boeing 1989) and FAA  Statistical  and Handbook of  Aviation. various years, for the 
number of planes. The number of seats for each model, annual utilization, and speed for each 
model come from Gordon (1990a, table 4.8), taking the figure shown for the latest year listed. 
For models not covered by Gordon, data for similar models were used. 
my  alternative) and the BEA structures deflator. These are converted in sec- 
tion 2 into two alternative series on total capital input, using the BEA struc- 
tures deflator in each case and BEA weights for equipment and structures. 
Because the alternative equipment deflator (line lb) declines relative to the 
BEA deflator (la)  throughout, but fastest during 1959-69,  the corresponding 
alternative real capital input measure (2b) grows faster than BEA throughout, 
but the difference is also greatest in 1959-69.  Also shown in section 2 is the 
capital input measure based on standardized capacity that adjusts for size and 
speed of aircraft but not for operating efficiency. After 1959 its growth rate Table 10.13  Growth in Multifactor Productivity: Air lkansportation, 1948-1987 
(annual percentage growth rates) 
1948-59  1959-69  1969-78  1978-87 
1. Investment deflators: 
a. BEA equipment  3.05 
c. BEA structures  1.59 
b. Alternative equipment  -2.89 
2. Real capital input (equipment and structures): 
a. BEA 
b. BEA with alternative equipment 
c. Standardized seat miles* 
a. Unrevised BEA 
b. Revised BEA 
c. BLS 
a. BEA labor input 
b. BLS labor input 
c. Fuel input 
d. Materials input 
e. Government input 
a. With NIPA unrevised output and 
b. With NIPA revised output and 
With BLS output and labor input: 
c. BEA capital input 
d. BEA capital input with alterna- 
tive equipment deflator 
e. Standardized seat miles 
f. Same as 5c with government in- 
put 
g. Line 5d with output smoothing: 
remove effect of changes in real 
yield and real GNP 
deflator 
3. output: 
4. Other components of MFP growth: 










































6.90  4.79 
1.89  2.93 
8.10  5.56 
3.48  0.58 
9.14  4.71 
3.86  4.67 
4.33  2.28 
5.38  6. I6 
5.43  5.57 
1.49  4.26 
0.46  2.35 
0.53  3.95 
3.15  7.26 
1.21  4.33 
2.22  -2.00 











Sources by line: (la, lc) BEA wealth tape. (lb)  The aircraft index comes from Gordon (1990a, 
table B.9, 620) and the ground equipment index comes from the same source (table B.8, 618), 
with respective weights of 0.8  and 0.2. (2a, 2b) Equipment capital (cumulated with BEA weights 
from lines  la and  lb) is combined with structures capital using BEA weights. (2c) From table 
10.12, line 2a. (3a, 3b, 3c) See sources to table  10.2. (4a, 4b) See sources to table  10.2 (4c) 
Total gallons of  aviation gasoline and jet fuel from National Transportation Statistics. various 
years, and from the CAB Handbook ofAirline Statistics. The price of both types of fuel is from 
National  Transportation Statistics, various years,  and from the WPI and  producer price index 
prior to 1970. (4d) Nominal materials input for 1969 and 1979 is from James (1982, table  1-4, 
10) and for 1989 is from World Aviation Directory, winter 1990, table  101, X-17, and is inter- 
polated for other years, and is deflated by the average of the PPI for intermediate supplies and of 
the revised BEA airline output deflator. (4e)  Nominal expenditure on airways and airports from 
Transportation in America, Historical Compendium, updated with May  1989 issue, and interpo- 
lated between data available at  five-year intervals before  1970. Airways deflated by  the NIPA 
deflator for nondefense expenditure and airports by the NIPA deflator for nonresidential structures 
(deflators implicit before 1959, fixed weight after). (5) MFP indexes are Tornqvist indexes, with 
nominal shares from the sources listed for secs. 3 and 4 of  this table.  Methodology for output 
smoothing (line 5g) explained in the text. Smoothed MFP series for 1952-87  in line 5g is linked 
to actual MFP series for 1948-51  for the calculation of 1948-1959  growth rate. 
*Standardized seat miles for 1954-59  are linked to the BEA series for 1948-54. 406  Robert J. Gordon 
lies between that of the alternative capital series, indicating that the effect of 
greater aircraft size and speed are not fully measured by the BEA deflator, but 
that additional improvements were made in fuel and labor efficiency that are 
captured by  the alternative deflator and not by  standardized capacity. Figure 
10.2 plots the three capital input measures. 
Sections 3 and 4 of table 10.13 display the growth rates of alternative out- 
put measures and of  the other inputs. We  note a substantial reduction in the 
ratio of energy to output after 1969 but not before and a decline in the ratio of 
materials input to output before 1978 but not afterward (reflecting in  part the 
greater importance of travel agent commissions in the 1980s). Finally, a series 
on real government expenditures on airports and air traffic control (line 4e) 
indicates a decline in the ratio to airline output throughout. Surprisingly, the 
ratio of government input to airline output declines least rapidly after 1978. 
The implied growth rates of alternative MFP indexes appear in section 5. 
The first (line 5a) combines the BEA unrevised output and employment series 
with the BEA capital stock series, while line 5b introduces the BEA revised 
output series and shifts to a value-added concept for calculating MFP growth 
since 1977.5'  The remaining MFP indexes in section 5 replace the BEA output 
and employment series with those from the BLS. Line 5c uses the BEA capital 
input series and differs from the revised all-BEA series in line 5b by growing 
more rapidly throughout, but particularly in  1959-69.  The next two series 
replace BEA capital with, respectively, that based on my  alternative equip- 
ment deflator and on the standardized capacity measure of  input. The final 
series (line 5f) introduces government input and appropriately reweighs all 
input shares. 
Annual values of four MFP measures are plotted in figure 10.3, correspond- 
ing to table 10.13, lines 5a through 5d. Here we see the importance of choos- 
ing reference dates at comparable stages of the business cycle. In particular, 
all four measures of MFP show a local peak in 1978-79  and a sharp decline 
through  1981, resulting from the recession and the PATCO  strike. Airline 
MFP performance in the  1980s looks much better measured from the  1981 
trough than from the 1978 or 1979 peaks. 
The MFP indexes for airlines are unanimous in showing a slowdown after 
1978 and implicitly no efficiency gain from deregulation. Some observers, 
particularly Caves, Christensen, and Trethewey (CCT) (1983, 1984), date de- 
51. In  all the MFP calculations in this paper, the MFP growth rates based on a value  added 
rather than gross concept of output (i.e., for all BEA railroad indexes, for BEA revised airlines 
and trucking since  1977, and for our alternative trucking index since 1977) are calculated as the 
value-added share in gross output (a,)  times the growth rate of value-added productivity (0,).  Thus 
if total MFP growth is given by 
0 = q -  (1 -  aJm -  avi,thenv  = [q -  (1 -  av)m]/av,O,  = v -  i, 
and the desired MFP growth rate can be calculated as 0 = a,  (v -  i)  = aV0".  Here growth rates 
refer to gross output (4).  materials (m),  a weighted average of  labor and capital inputs  (i),  and 
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regulation prior to 1978, because fare reductions beginning in  1977 caused a 
jump in  1978 traffic and load factor. The debate over the date of deregulation 
can be easily resolved by a statistical decomposition to purge the MFP series 
for the effects of changing prices and aggregate demand. We first run a regres- 
sion over  1950-88  of the annual change in  airline output on two constants 
(split at 1969), the annual change in real yield, and the annual change in real 
GNP (both  entered as the current and one-lagged  change).  The results are 
highly significant and indicate that fully 73 percent of the variance in annual 
output can be explained by changes in current and lagged real yield and real 
GNP during 1950-69  and 86 percent during 1970-88.  This allows us to com- 
pute the counterfactual growth of airline output on the assumption that real 
yield,  real  GNP, or both  grew  at their  mean  1950-69  and  1970-88  rates 
rather than fluctuating as actually occurred. Next, we run a regression of an- 
nual changes in MFP on changes in airline output and use these coefficients to 
determine the annual growth rate of MFP with the various counterfactual out- 
put series. 
The results are shown in line 5g of table 10.13. Comparing lines 5d and 5g, 
the full adjustment reduces the MFP growth slowdown between 1959-78  and 
1978-87  by about one quarter, from 1.38 percentage points to 1.02 percent- 
age points, and by a smaller relative amount if the rapid productivity period 
before  1959 is included. If the break point for deregulation is changed from 
1978 to  1976, as CCT would recommend, the slowdown from  1959-76  to 
1976-87  is raised from 0.65 points to 0.90 points. The similarity of the cycli- 
cally corrected slowdown figures,  1.02 points  with a  1978 break  and 0.90 
with a 1976 break, shows that our cyclical and yield corrections almost totally 
capture the causes of rapid MFP growth in the 1976-78  interval. 
To  conclude, we find that airline productivity growth slowed after deregu- 
lation by every measure and that this conclusion is independent of the chosen 
borderline date. The remaining unmeasured biases in output indexes are off- 
setting, with a slight upward bias of about 0.3 percent per annum owing to 
extended scheduled flight times (table  10.10) offset by  a downward bias of 
perhaps  1.0 percent per annum owing to the unmeasured value of  frequent- 
flyer benefits. 
10.4  Railroads 
The measurement of railroad ALP and MFP is more straightforward than 
for airlines.  Railroads produce an intermediate good, and so we have less 
concern with the quality of output than with airlines. The most important po- 
tential measurement error for output, the changing mix of shipments of differ- 
ent values and labor requirements, is already taken into account in the BLS 
output measure that we use throughout this section for the period since 1948. 
There  are  probably  unmeasured  dimensions  of  output  quality,  consisting 409  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
mainly of the benefits of improved computer tracking of shipments, but these 
are likely to be sufficiently minor that they can be safely ignored here.52 
There is a common impression that productivity in the railroad industry in 
the 1980s was revived by a combination of deregulation, relaxation of feath- 
erbedding work rules, mergers, and the abandonment of unprofitable 
Indeed, there were pathbreaking changes,  particularly a reduction from 65 
carriers in  1977 to  15 in  1988, and a dramatic abandonment of unprofitable 
track,  which in turn implied a sharp decline in the capital stock (see table 
10.14). However, the appearance of rapid growth in ALP, for example, 8.17 
percent per annum since 1979 for the BLS data in table 10.2 may not carry 
over to MFP. Caves, Christensen, and Swanson (CCS) (1980), show that MFP 
growth, properly estimated to a modem cost-function framework, is less than 
half  of  ALP  growth over the period  1951-74.  Further, as we  shall see, the 
outstanding MFP growth achieved by  railroads in  the  1980s is nothing new 
but rather represents the continuation of a longer historical process; in the late 
1980s railroads carried one-third more freight traffic than in the late 1940s 
with only one-sixth as many workers and much less capital and fuel input. 
We  learned in part 10.2 that MFP measures are inaccurate in the presence 
of nonconstant returns to scale. Indeed CCS (1980, 1981) do find significant 
evidence of  increasing returns to scale for railroads, but the departure from 
constant returns is sufficiently small (about 0.09) that their estimated growth 
rate of MFP is an identical 1.5 percent per year with and without an allowance 
for increasing returns (1980, 177-78).  Thus in the rest of this section we ig- 
nore the returns to scale issue. 
The ingredients in our calculation of MFP and value added for railroads are 
displayed in table  10.14. As an alternative to the BEA data on the capital 
stock of railroad equipment and structures, we have developed for the equip- 
ment component a Tornqvist-weighted index of  the aggregate horsepower of 
railroad locomotives and the ton capacity of railroad freight cars. The growth 
rates of  the BEA and alternative equipment stock indexes are compared in 
lines la and lb  of table 10.14 and are quite consistent. Also, much more than 
half of  railroad capital consists of structures, so MFF'  estimates are robust to 
the choice of the two alternative measures of equipment capital  .54 
The implied MFP growth estimates, Tornqvist weighted with actual nomi- 
nal cost shares of labor and materials, the assumed material share, and a resid- 
ual share for capital, are shown in lines 4c and 4d. Over the entire 1948-87 
period, the respective growth rates of the revised BEA and the two new MFP 
52. The best recent general discussion of productivity and service quality improvements for 
railroads is Tully (1991). On the use of computers and advanced train control systems, see Mach- 
alaba (1988) and Schwartz (1989). 
53.  See Flint (1986) and Kupfer (1989). 
54. We  also experimented by varying the weights on equipment vs. structures from the BEA 
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Table 10.14  Growth in Multifactor Productivity: Railroads, 1948-1987 
1948-59  1959-69  1969-78  1978-87 
I. Real capital input (equipment): 
a. BEA  0.50 
b. Alternative  -0.84 
2. Real capital input (equipment & structures): 
a. BEA  -  1.50 
b. Alternative  -  1.75 
3. output: 
a. Unrevised BEA  -  1.75 
b. Revised BEA  -  1.75 
c. BLS  -0.97 
4. Other components: 
b. Labor input  -  4.42 
c. Fuel  -2.80 
e. Materials  -  1.44 
a. BEA unrevised output & input  1.34 
b. BEA revised output & input  1.34 
With BLS output & labor input: 
d. Alternative capital input  2.13 
5. MFP  growth: 
c. BEA capital input  2.04 
0.55 
0.73 
-  1.87 













-  1.78 











-  2.41 
-1.81 
-  2.00 





-  2.77 





Sources by line: (la) BEA wealth tape. (lb) The number of steam and diesel electric locomotives 
are from Railroad Facts and Yearbook of  Railroad Facts, various years. Data for the horsepower 
and the average tractive effort of locomotives in service are from the Statistical Abstract as well 
as Transport Statistics in the  United States and Railroad Facts. Total freight cars in service were 
taken from Railroad Facts and Yearbook of  Railroad Facts. Data on the tons per car was from the 
series on average freight carload from Railroad Facts and Yearbook of  Railroad Facts. (2a-2b) 
Both series use BEA structures capital and BEA weights to combine structures and equipment. 
(3a-3c)  Same sources as table 10.2 and 10.4. (4a) Same source as table 10.2. (4b) Total fuel use 
and  the price of  the fuel are from Statistics of  Class I  Railroads  and Narional  Transportation 
Statistics, various years, as well as Railroad Facts and Yearbook of  Railroad Facts. (4c) Nonfuel 
materials use is assumed to be a fixed 10 percent of total operating revenues and is deflated by 
the GNP  deflator. (5)  Inputs are combined with nominal expenditure weights, obtained from the 
above sources. 
indexes are quite close-3.03,  3.35, and 3.33 percent per annum. The con- 
sistent growth rates displayed by  the BEA and alternative MFP indexes are 
reassuring, because the first are calculated from value added without subtract- 
ing materials and fuel, whereas the second are based on gross output. How- 
ever the payoff from deregulation when MFP growth in 1978-87  is contrasted 
with 1947-78  is, respectively, 2.44, 1.43, and 1.42, that is, less in the alter- 
native than in the BEA indexes. 
For the period of overlap (195 1-74)  the average growth rate of all our MFP 
index in line 4c is substantially higher than that constructed by  CCS, 3.45 
versus 1.52 percentage points. CCS provide a decomposition (1980, 177-80) 
showing that a similar difference between the conventional method and their 
results can be  attributed entirely to a differing treatment of  output and input 
weights. The essence of  the difference is that CCS place greater weight on 411  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
passenger output (because they take the weight of passenger cost in total cost, 
not the weight of  passenger revenue traffic in total traffic).55  Thus the more 
rapid growth of  MFP in this study is in part due to the cost savings of  the 
disappearance of  rail passenger traffic, which CCS  largely subsume within 
their slow-growing output index. 
Overall, we have considerable confidence in our conclusion in table 10.14 
that  MFP  growth  did  accelerate after  1978, but  by  much  less than  ALP 
growth. Alone among the three major transportation subsectors, railroads ex- 
hibited rapid MFP growth in the 1980s and helped to offset the productivity 
slowdown in  the rest of  the service sector. However, in light of  the strong 
labor-saving effects of deregulation measured by  Berndt et al., (1990), it re- 
mains surprising that the railroad industry did as well before 1978 as our al- 
ternative MFP indexes indicate. 
10.5  Bucking 
Trucking shares with railroads the fact that output is almost entirely an in- 
termediate good, and so changes in the quality of output do not directly affect 
aggregate output and prod~ctivity.’~  However, the measurement of  trucking 
output and employment is more prone to error than that for railroads, since 
(as we learned in part  10. l), alternative indexes cover differing fractions of 
the total trucking industry experiencing quite different productivity perform- 
ance. For instance, there was so much entry and exit in the trucking industry 
in the 1980s that a deflator based on the shrinking part of the industry could 
overstate price increases for the more efficient (and nonunion) new entrants. 
Winston et a1  (1990,  11) report a “huge influx of entry” following the 1980 
deregulation of trucking, consisting almost entirely of  class I11 carriers pro- 
viding truckload (TL) service. The number of class I11 carriers increased from 
14,941 to 43,364; the number of class I and I1 carriers decreased from 3104 
to 2477 (Salgupis 1991). The share of class I11 carriers increased from 82.8 
percent to 94.7 percent over this period. The BLS data source reports only 
786 class I1 carriers in  1987, indicating incomplete coverage. A major shift in 
the trucking industry occurred in  response to deregulation from less-than- 
truckload (LTL) general freight carriers, the core of the BLS sample, to “ad- 
vanced TL” firms using nonunion driver teams and relays for service on high- 
55. The other major difference identified by  CCS, the understated capital input weights they 
attribute to Kendrick, does not  apply to this study, where the capital share is determined as a 
residual and includes all of the items, e.g., rent and property taxes, that CCS advocate for inclu- 
sion. 
56. This section contains no comparisons with other academic studies, because there appears 
to be no study analogous to CCS (1980) that presents a time-series MFP index for trucking on the 
basis of the cost function or production function method. There is a proliferation of studies, but 
they all are limited to the estimation of  micro structural parameters in panels of  firms without 
examination of time-series properties.  See Chiang and Friedlaender (1984,  1985), Friedlaender 
and Spady (1981), Friedlaender and Chiang (1981), Friedlaender and Bruce (1985), Daughety, 
Nelson, and Vigdor (1985), and Ying (1990). 412  Robert J. Gordon 
density traffic corridors, “thereby ensuring high  vehicle use and low costs” 
(Winston et al.  1990, 13). New entry came also from owner operators, and 
this could cause a shift in output relative to employment that could be inter- 
preted spuriously as an increase in productivity. The distinction between TL 
and LTL carriers is highlighted by the estimate of Winston et al. that in the 
absence of deregulation  over the interval  1977-85  TL rates  would have in- 
creased by  55 percent; LTL rates would have increased by a much larger 116 
percent.  The actual  increases  were  5 lpercent and 79 percent,  respectively, 
indicating that deregulation had a much larger effect on LTL carriers. 
In this paper we develop MFP indexes based on two alternative measures 
of capital and two of output. The first capital stock measure is that produced 
by the BEA by the same procedures as for airlines and railroads, and already 
used in tables  10.13 and 10.14 to compute the BEA index of MFP for those 
two industries. The alternative capital input measure developed here is based 
on the  alternative deflator  for producers’  durable  equipment  investment  in 
trucks  from Gordon  (1990a).  This deflator  combines  separate deflators  for 
automobiles (which behave quite similarly to the automobile consumer price 
index [CPI] after the late  1950s) and for diesel engines. However, this defla- 
tor, like the CPI and existing NIPA deflator for automobiles, assumes that the 
addition of  antipollution  equipment  represents  an increase in quality rather 
than an increase in price.  Although such equipment may or may not benefit 
society in proportion to its cost, it does not represent an increase in quality as 
viewed  by  the  firm  using  an  automobile  (or truck)  as  a capital  input.  As 
Triplett (1983) has emphasized, there are two correct measures of capital in- 
put: one for output deflation  and  one for input deflation.  Here we need  an 
input deflator  that treats  the cost of  legislated equipment as an increase in 
price, not an increase in quantity. Fortunately,  it is possible to adjust for this 
equipment, and the resulting hybrid index is likely to be a more satisfactory 
capital input deflator than other existing indexes. As shown in the comparison 
of  lines la and  lb  of table  10.15, and on an annual basis in  figure 10.4, the 
new deflator implies a much more rapid increase in the capital stock in the 
first half  of  the  postwar,  because  of  a  substantial reduction  in  the  relative 
prices of our automobile and diesel engine deflators relative to the BEA truck- 
ing deflator. 
We also develop a new output measure in table 10.15, line 2c, to compare 
with the revised BEA output measure shown in line 2b. This takes nominal 
BEA output and then deflates it with the “yield” (revenue per ton-mile) index 
shown above in table  10.5, line 2c. Because the yield measure is only avail- 
able back  in  1960 and  appears  to agree  with  the  BEA deflator  until  about 
1972, the alternative output measure differs from the BEA series only in the 
1970s and 1980s. An interesting aspect of these series is their implied capital- 
output ratios.  The BEA capital  and output series (lines  la and 2b) imply a 
radical shift between a falling capital-output ratio in  1948-69  to a relatively 413  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
Table 10.15  Growth in Multifactor Productivity: Ikucking, 1948-1987 
1948-59  1959-69  1969-78  1978-87 
1. Real capital input (equipment 
& structures): 
a. BEA  3.79  3.29  4.93  2.33 
b. Alternative  5.96  5.65  5.69  2.74 
a. BEA unrevised output  7.06  5.56  4.92  0.55 
b. BEA revised output  7.06  5.56  4.80  1.87 
c. Alternative output  7.06  5.57  5.80  3.02 
2. output 
3. Other components: 
a. BEA labor input  3.49  2.15  2.12  1.64 
b. Fuel  4.68  3.26  4.84  -  2.72 
c. Materials  7.79  6.10  3.47  -0.89 
d. Highway capital  ...  4.30  2.23  1.40 
a. BEA unrevised output & input  2.91  2.51  1.49  -0.75 
4. MFP growth: 
b. BEA revised output & input  2.97  2.51  1.38  0.00 
c. Alternative output & labor in- 
put, BEA capital input  2.91  2.52  2.38  0.97 
d. Alternative output & input  2.05  1.51  2.06  0.82 
e. Alternative output & input, 
with government capital  ...  1.47  2.36  0.86 
Sources by line: (la) From BEA wealth tape.  (lb) Computed as in tables 10.13 and  10.14 by 
substituting a new equipment deflator (Gordon 1990a, table C3, 698) for the BEA deflator, while 
using BEA nominal equipment investment, BEA structures capital, and BEA weights for equip- 
ment and structures. (2a, 2b) Same sources as tables 10.2 and 10.4. (212) Deflate nominal, revised 
BEA output with alternative deflator, source given in notes to table  10.5,  line 2c. (3a) Same 
source as table 10.2. (3b) Total fuel cost from cost of fuel per mile, total vehicle miles, and price 
of  fuel from American  Trucking Trends. (3c) Materials assumed to be  10 percent of revenue, 
deflated by the average of the producer price index for intermediate supplies and the revised BEA 
trucking output deflator. (3d) Government highway capital is gross constant-dollar capital stock 
of  federal, state, and local highways,  from Fixed Reproducible  Tangible Wealth in the United 
States, 1925-85.  1985-87  was extrapolated from 1984-85 growth rate. (4) Inputs are combined 
with nominal expenditure weights, obtained from the above sources. Share of government high- 
way input is taken to be half of the ratio of government expenditure on highways (same source 
as table 10.15, line Id) to intercity trucking revenue (same source as table 10.5, line lc). 
stable ratio after  1969. The two new series (lines lb  and 2c) imply that the 
capital-output ratio was roughly stable throughout. 
When we combine the BEA  and new capital and output series with a fixed 
set of labor input, fuel input, and materials input series, we arrive at the MFP 
indexes shown in section 4 of table 10.15; annual data for the indexes on lines 
4a-4d  are plotted in figure 10.5.57  The first in line 4a uses the unrevised BEA 
57.  Recall that since 1977 the revised BEA and alternative output indexes refer to value added, 
and thus the corresponding MFP indexes in table  10.15,  lines 4b through 4e,  are calculated as 
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Fig. 10.5  Four versions of multifactor productivity: Bucking industry, 
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series for output and  input and exhibits a sharp productivity growth  slow- 
down, especially after 1978. The BEA output revisions make little difference 
in line 4b; MFP growth slows to zero after 1978. In line 4c we replace the 
BEA output series with the alternative output series based on the “yield” defla- 
tor, while retaining the BEA capital index. This makes a substantial difference 
but still leaves a post-1978 MFP growth slowdown. The next step in line 4d is 
to replace the BEA capital input index with the index based on the alternative 
equipment deflator. By  slowing MFP growth before  1978, this reduces but 
does not  eliminate the post-1978 slowdown, and reduces the slowdown to 
only 0.35 percentage points when  1969-87  is compared to the pre-1969 pe- 
riod. In contrast the two BEA indexes indicate post-1969 slowdowns of  2.38 
and 2.06 percentage points, respectively. 
A final MFP index is developed in line 4e. This adds to the contribution of 
input growth the increase in the real gross stock of government “highway cap- 
ital.’’ To obtain a share, we note that total government expenditures on high- 
ways in 1978 were 48 percent of intercity trucking revenues. Arbitrarily allo- 
cating half the highway expenditures to cars and half to trucks, we obtain a 
weight of 24 percent to be applied to the growth rates of highway capital (table 
10.15, line 3d). For the resulting MFP index to be significantly different from 
the other indexes, government capital would have been required to grow at 
radically different rates than the average for other inputs. However, this did 
not occur, and the fully inclusive MFP index on line 4e of table 10.15 tells the 
same story as that on line 4d. 
Overall we  should have observed some decline in  the productivity of  the 
trucking industry after the first oil shock, if only because of a decline in aver- 
age highway  Indeed, this is what is implied by the intermediate series 
using BEA capital and alternative output. However, the alternative capital se- 
ries implies that MFP growth in trucking did not actually slow down apprecia- 
bly in the 1970s and 1980s when the two decades are lumped together. Rather, 
faster growth in the conventional BEA measure in the early postwar years is 
attributed largely to the more rapid  growth in  the quality-adjusted capital 
stock of trucking equipment in the early postwar period, due in large part to 
improvements in the efficiency and durability of diesel engines.59 
10.6  Conclusion 
The goals of this paper have been to develop new measures of MFP growth 
in the three main components of transportation-air,  rail, and trucking-that 
allow for changes in the quality of  both  output and inputs. The new  MFP 
58.  Average motor vehicle speed on highways dropped from 63.8 MPH in  1970 to 57.6 MPH 
in  1974 and then increased gradually to 59.7 MPH in  1986 and  1987 (Staristical  Abstract  1989, 
table 1025, and 1990, table 1047). 
59.  Gordon (1990a, 505-12)  contains a detailed case study of diesel engine prices and quality 
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measures are summarized in table 10.16 and compared with the official mea- 
sure implied by current NIPA (or BEA) data, both before and after the recent 
NIPA output revisions.  Lines  la  and  lb of  table  10.16 exhibit MFP growth 
for transportation, using NIPA data for output (without and with revision) and 
employment, together with the BEA capital stock estimates and our series on 
fuel  and  materials  inputs prior to  1977 for airlines and  trucking  (railroads 
throughout are based on value added). Here as elsewhere in table 10.16 “total 
transportation” refers only to the three major subsectors. All MFP series for 
total transportation  are Tornqvist indexes that use annual revised NIPA data 
on nominal  output in the three  subsectors as weights.  The post-1973 slow- 
down on line la  is 2.61 annual percentage points but declines to 0.90 points 
on line lb  with the recent output revisions. 
Line lc  displays the first alternative measure, which switches to BLS mea- 
sures of airline and railroad  output and employment and to our new  yield- 
deflated trucking output measure, as indicated in the notes to table 10.16. This 
switch boosts MFP growth both  before  and after  1973, but leaves the post- 
1973 slowdown almost identical to the revised NIPA index. The second alter- 
native on line Id substitutes our new capital input measures and reduces MFP 
growth more before  1973 than after, thus eliminating almost one-third of  the 
post-1973 slowdown on line lc. However, the second alternative makes a sub- 
stantial difference in the interpretation of  the post- 1979 deregulation period, 
reducing the post-1979 slowdown almost to zero. 
As shown in figure  10.6, the annual plot of the four MFP indexes reveals 
substantial  cyclical  fluctuations,  particularly  in  the  late  1970s  and  early 
1980s. As explained in the notes to table  10.16, the cyclical component of 
MFP fluctuations due to aggregate real GNP changes is purged, and the cycli- 
cally corrected growth rates are displayed in the bottom half of table 10.16. 
The cyclical correction substantially boosts MFP growth in 1973-79  and cuts 
it slightly in 1979-87,  thus reducing the size of the post-1973 slowdown and 
slightly increasing the magnitude of the post- 1979 slowdown. 
The productivity growth story told by the revised NIPA index (line lb) and 
our final index (line Id) are surprisingly similar, given all the differences be- 
tween them. Our adjustments boost MFP growth by switching to alternative 
output and employment  indexes but then  largely  offset this by switching to 
faster-growing  capital  input  indexes.  However,  these  similarities  disguise 
marked  differences  at the  industry  level, particularly  in the first half of the 
postwar  period.  Our alternative output and employment data produce MFP 
indexes that rise more rapidly for airlines and railroads over 1948-69,  but this 
is largely offset by our alternative capital input data that cut MFP growth for 
trucking below the rate estimated when conventional capital input indexes are 
used. 
Did deregulation boost productivity in transportation? Surprisingly, the an- 
swer is no. The great success story is the railroad industry, but all our indexes 
for airlines and trucking display a lamentable MFP growth record in the 1980s Table 10.16  Four Measures of Multifactor Productivity Growth for 'hansportation, Annual Percentage Growth Rates, 1948-1987  and Selected 
Intervals, with and without Cyclical Correction 
1948-59  1959-66 
(1)  (2) 





a. BEA unrevised output  1.90  4.20 
b. BEA revised output &  1.90  4.20 
c. Alternative output,  2.37  4.55 
d. Alternative output &  2.08  3.96 
2. Cyclically corrected data: 
a. BEA unrevised output  2.34  3.24 
b. BEA revised output &  2.28  3.48 
& input 
input 
Slowdown,  Slowdown, 
1973-87  -  1979-87  - 
1966-73  1973-79  1979-87  1948-73  1973-87  1948-73  1948-79 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
1.25  0.39  -0.73  2.36  -0.25  -2.61  -  2.70 
1.25  0.99  1.82  2.36  1.46  -0.90  -0.29 
2.32  1.64  2.33  2.97  2.04  -0.93  -0.38 
.62  I .36  2.15  2.47  1.81  -  0.66  -0.11 
.63  0.91  -0.80  2.39  -0.07  ~  2.46  -2.83 
.55  1.46  1.73  2.41  1.61  -  0.80  -0.42 
c. Alternative output,  2.31  4.25  2.47  I .95  2.23  2.90  2.11  -0.79  -0.52 
d. Alternative output &  2.02  3.63  1.78  1.67  2.05  2.40  1.89  -0.51  -0.25 
BEA capital 
capital 
Sources by Line: Tornqvist weights (nominal output shares from revised NIPA table 6.  I) are used to aggregate MFP growth for airlines, railroads,  and trucking. 
(la) BEA unrevised concept uses NIPA unrevised output, NIPA employment, and BEA real gross capital stock of equipment and structures, together with fuel 
and materials inputs from tables  10.12-10.14.  No allowance is made for the value of time or for government capital. (lb) BEA revised concept replaces NIPA 
unrevised output with NIPA revised output for 1977-87.  Because revised NIPA output is a value-added concept, materials and full inputs are not subtracted out. 
See n. 51 in text. (lc)  This measure replaced NIPA output and employment with BLS output and employment for airlines and railroads, and uses the revised NIPA 
output series for trucking with the new deflator, from table 10.15, line 2c. (Id) This measure starts from line lc and replaces BEA capital with the respective 
capital indexes (see table  10.13, line 5d; table  10.14, line 5d; and table 10.15, line 4d). (2a-2d)  For the corresponding line of sec. I, the growth rate of MFP is 
run on five constants corresponding to the first five columns of this table, and on the current and one lagged change in the ratio of  actual to natural GNP, from 
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that more than cancels out the railroad success. These conclusions regarding 
the divergent performances of  the three subsectors are extremely robust to 
alternative dating of deregulation. 
In conclusion, this paper has explained much but not all of the large post- 
1973 productivity growth slowdown in the transportation industry displayed 
in table 10.1 above and in line la  of table 10.16, based on the NIPA and BEA 
data published prior to January, 1991. Much of the reinterpretation involves 
simple issues of data construction, reviewed in part 10.1, and pre-1991 inves- 
tigators could have obtained roughly the same conclusion as in this paper by 
ignoring the old NIPA data and instead using BLS data on output and employ- 
ment. The NIPA output revisions bring the NIPA and BLS output data much 
closer together for the period since 1977, and we view the prompt response of 
the NIPA  output revisions to the earlier criticisms contained in Gordon and 
Baily (1988) as part of the overall contribution of our research. 
Our new MFP indexes rely not only on the choice of  the “best” output and 
employment indexes, but also on the development of  new capital input mea- 
sures that adjust more fully for quality changes in transportation equipment 
than  the  official  measures.  The resulting  MFP  indexes grow  substantially 
slower during the first part of the postwar period than when conventional cap- 
ital input measures are used; the overall effect on transportation as a whole 
is limited by  the relatively small weight of  air transportation in  the trans- 
portation aggregate during the  years  when  “most of  the action” occurred 
Several novel elements of our study are not incorporated into the final MFP 
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indexes in table 10.16. We have found that airline deregulation yielded a small 
time saving from the elimination of  interline connections that was more than 
offset by a small time cost of extended scheduled times (which we interpret as 
due to inadequate government investment in airports and air traffic control). A 
much greater contribution  was made by the value of time saved through the 
invention of air transport industry, which should be credited to the manufac- 
turers  of  airframes  and engines. This value  (roughly  $182 billion  in  1989) 
amounts to a massive ten times U.S.  sales of commercial aircraft, four times 
the domestic passenger revenue of U. S. airlines, and 3.5 percent of GNP. 
Our study of MFP growth in transportation has yielded additional findings: 
Airline deregulation greatly increased the availability of nonstop flights and 
forced only a negligible number of passengers off  of nonstop flights onto con- 
necting  flights,  contrary to the conventional  wisdom. The increased use of 
travel agents had little effect on MFP growth, as decreases in other purchases 
of  materials offset the increased use by airlines of purchased travel agent ser- 
vices.  Finally,  the perception  that the  government  has shortchanged  infra- 
structure investment  in airports, airways, and highways,  although plausible 
anecdotally in view of extended scheduled flight times, is not supported quan- 
titatively  by the government  capital and investment data that we have com- 
piled; MFP estimates are little changed when plausible adjustments are made 
for government inputs. 
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Comment  Robin C. Sickles 
The paper by Robert J. Gordon follows on the heels of his excellent mono- 
graph, The Measurement of  Durable Goods Prices (1990), and pursues com- 
plementary  issues in the measurement of  factor productivity  growth for the 
transportation sector. The current study is at the industry level and follows the 
growth in factor productivity  in the airline, railroad, and trucking industries 
for the last 40 years (1948-88).  The conceptual and measurement problems 
that Gordon faced, and in my opinion largely overcame, were substantial. The 
work  addresses a number  of  important  issues on its way to making its key 
point. It is that the mismeasurement  of output and input indexes and the use 
of  partial instead of multifactor productivity (MFP) indexes has lead to erro- 
neous conclusions by some researchers that there was a post- 1973 productiv- 
ity  slowdown  in  transportation  mirroring the  experience in  the  total  U.S. 
economy. Gordon points out that this is a somewhat counterintuitive empirical 
finding because the transportation  sector was deregulated in the mid- 1970s, 
and productivity  should have benefited  from less constrained decision mak- 
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ing. The counterintuition is rendered illusory by Gordon’s new data series by 
which he concludes that there was not a post-1973 slowdown in MFP growth 
for the transportation sector. Although I am  quite sympathetic to  Gordon’s 
arguments I do have a number of points to make with regard to the research 
issues he addresses and with regard to complementary research that addresses 
these issues somewhat differently. 
As  I have said, the major point of  Gordon’s paper is that the measured 
productivity slowdown in the transportation industry is a measurement prob- 
lem. Although the topic of  the paper is on the transportation sector, Gordon 
gives disproportionate coverage to the airline industry; so will my  comments 
on his paper. There are a number of  convincing reasons why measurement 
problems plague the evaluation of  MFP performance and the attendant na- 
tional income and product account (NIPA) estimates for average labor produc- 
tivity (ALP) in the transportation sector in general and the airline industry in 
particular. One reason has been discussed by a number of researchers and was 
pointed out by Baily and Gordon (1988). In the airline industry the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) output deflators “fail to adjust properly for the in- 
troduction of discount fares.” However, Gordon points to a more fundamental 
reason-that  ALP is not an appropriate index to use because a lot has been 
going on with the other factors such as energy and capital. MFP growth rates 
are different from ALP as one would expect because there has been a substan- 
tial change in  relative input prices and relative factor intensities. But doing 
the right thing inevitably has a cost, and here it is in requiring the capital 
service flows to be  estimated correctly. The measurement of  capital service 
flows and its price and its decomposition into such sources as scale, technical 
change, and so on can be problematic especially when, for example, the tech- 
nology (possibly endogenous) is embodied in an airplane’s design character- 
istics (Good, Nadiri, and Sickles 1991). It should be stressed that the trans- 
portation data series that Gordon constructs are annual aggregates. There is 
an acknowledged trade-off between the length of the series and the potential 
for mismeasurement of MFP and ALP resulting from both temporal and cross- 
sectional aggregation. Moreover,  the motivation for examining aggregated 
data as opposed to firm level data (which is available for all three major trans- 
portation industries) may  be misplaced  when one considers the substantial 
changes in industry structure and the menu of  new technologies introduced 
into these industries. The 1948-88  series that Gordon constructs may in fact 
be nonstationary and chained indexes such as the discrete approximation to 
the Divisia index used  herein may not properly represent shifts in  the mo- 
ments of  the underlying data.  This concern was  in part what  lead Sickles 
(1985), Sickles, Good, and Johnson (1986), and Good, Nadiri, and Sickles 
(1991) to break up their firm level quarterly series for the airline industry 
(1968-87)  into epochs during which industry structure was more or less stable 
or to adopt modeling approaches that faced up to temporal and cross-sectional 
heterogeneity and changes in industry structure and incentives as a result of 424  Robert J. Gordon 
deregulation.  The Gordon and Good-Sickles  data do indicate rather remark- 
able agreement with  respect  to industry  MFP growth rates for overlapping 
periods. However, the claim in the paper that these aggregate annual data can 
be used to estimate dynamic effects, effects of the idiosyncratic confluence of 
high energy  prices  and  low aggregated  demand prevalent  in the  1970s and 
1980s, as well as be able to deliver on the aim to disentangle the contribution 
of macrodemand, energy prices, deregulation, and microeconomic factors in 
the determination of the postwar productivity performance of the transporta- 
tion sector is to my mind overstated. 
Continuing with his critique of the input and output series constructed by 
the BEA and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Gordon has two specific dis- 
claimers to the veracity of published industry data. An example in the airline 
industry is the capital and labor supplied to it in the form of airports and their 
administrative  infrastructure  (e.g., air  traffic controllers  and  other Federal 
Aviation  Administration  personnel)  as well  as outsourcing  personnel  in the 
form of reservations clerks and sales agents at city ticket offices which are not 
accounted for and thus may bias labor and to some extent the capital input 
measures.  Outsourcing is a problem that is not unique to the airline industry, 
for example, the U.S. Postal Service USPS outsources to firms in the form of 
presort discounts. As Walter Oi (chap. 4, in this vol.) has pointed out, failure 
to properly  frame the production  process  as joint in household time and in 
formal business  inputs can cause serious mismeasurement  of the input mix 
and thus the MFP measures. Thus indirect  routing,  which presumably  re- 
quires  increased  household  time, can confound  standard growth accounting 
formulas that do not explicitly recognize the joint production process and can 
thus distort the measurement of value-added output. Gordon convincingly ad- 
dresses these points and concludes that indirect routing has indeed increased 
consumer  surplus.  Continuing  on  the  problems  with  BEA  and  BLS  ap- 
proaches to both ALP and MFP growth calculations, Gordon notes that in the 
airline industry the two series differ largely because of the aggregation prob- 
lem, because BLS employment grows less fast than the BEA figures (a fact 
largely  attributable  to  the  inclusion  of  Federal  Express  in  the  industry  in 
1986), and because  NIPA output  grows less fast than BLS figures because 
BEA uses deflated sales and BLS uses physical output and the deflator does 
not tract passenger  yield well.  With  respect to the inclusion of Federal Ex- 
press, however, is it not the case that the majority of their employees are really 
drivers of vans? (Also according to the Department of Transportation figures, 
roughly one-third of their employees are part-time.) He goes on to argue that 
measuring  the average price of  airline  service is dicey  and that even using 
yield as a deflator may overstate the growth of  airline output relative to true 
quality-corrected  output owing to the introduction of  the complex regime of 
discount fares since 1977. 
Gordon makes a number of  points about the mismeasurement of transpor- 
tation service output. First, quality changes may not be important because the 425  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
deterioration in quality of service and the enhanced quality of service due, for 
example, to advanced boarding and seat reservations in airlines, are more than 
likely to cancel each other out. Second, frequent-flyer programs have created 
a significant upward bias in passenger yield. Third, changes in the efficiency 
of producing a “quality adjusted ton mile are of  independent interest in pro- 
ductivity” because the production process has not been influenced by factors 
that have  influenced  quality,  such as price discrimination.  Here I disagree. 
Flight frequency and the routes themselves often cater to the business traveler 
and are influenced substantially by nonneutral quality changes. He concludes 
by stating that he has found the BLS data to be superior to the NIPA series for 
output and for employment. The NIPA productivity  calculations are clearly 
suspect, but is this really  a surprise in the airline industry? NIPA measures 
output by revenue and fares have been falling dramatically since 1977. Simi- 
larly, using revenue deflators such as the airfare component of the consumer 
price index does not recognize the extent of discounting of fares that has oc- 
curred. The same point could be made about the published tariffs of the LTL 
trucking  industry. They do not adequately reflect the amount of discounting 
and contract rates after the trucking industry was deregulated.  It is not clear 
that rail rate structures have changed significantly owing to the degree of com- 
petitive pressure from private-contract-exempt trucking. It is also unclear why 
Gordon  dismisses  the  dramatically  changing  shares  of  passenger  versus 
freight output for the reason that the NIPA index is so high and that the prob- 
lem is with the inability of the producer price index to reflect greater pricing 
flexibility after the rail industry was deregulated. Winston et al. (1990) point 
out that rate structures, especially the discounted tariff and contract rates, ap- 
pear to be quite stable before and after deregulation. 
The paper goes on to discuss MFP growth and its relation to the cost func- 
tion. Although all of the analysis is carried in terms of a single output it could 
have been couched in a multiple-output setting (Denny, Fuss, and Waverman 
1981). He imposes long run constant returns to scale. This is a strong assump- 
tion but one that does appear to have some empirical support. He goes on to 
discuss the capacity utilization issue and the mismeasurement of capital ser- 
vices  owing  to  changing  utilization  rates  (Hulten  1986; Berndt  and  Fuss 
1986). At this point I would like to point out an alternative to the conventional 
view of airline service output. The production function, on which MFP esti- 
mates are based, specifies the maximum output produced by a set of inputs. 
The closest proxy to this is the number of  available seats being moved from 
one place to another. Not unlike agriculture, unused seats are wastage because 
the distributor (marketer) of those seats has not done the job. In the case of 
the airlines, the farmer, the wholesaler, and the retailer are the same economic 
unit and a failure to correctly parcel up MFP growth among the various verti- 
cally integrated enterprises distorts measurement of output. Moreover, if rev- 
enue ton  mile is used, then  there are proxies for capacity utilization  (other 
than  load  factor) that may  be  superior.  In Sickles (1985) I constructed the 426  Robert J. Gordon 
flying capital series by scaling down the quantity  index on the basis of the 
discrepancy between the average time a plane was in service (ramp to ramp) 
during a quarter to the maximum that a plane of the same type was in service 
during the sample period in the entire industry. Also the work by Fke, Gros- 
skopf, Lovell,  and Pasurka (1989) and Fare, Grosskopf,  Lovell, and Yaisa- 
warng (forthcoming 1993) the producion of “goods” and “bads” could be used 
to evaluate the shadow prices of the “bad” output of the airlines, specifically 
indirect routing. Has there been a deterioration in the service provided by the 
carriers owing to indirect routing? Gordon counters the prevailing wisdom by 
convincingly  pointing  out that  indirect routing  has  increased travelers’  op- 
tions. However, the numbers that are cited as interlining of passengers may be 
systematically  misleading  because  of  code sharing.  Under code sharing,  a 
commuter carrier, for example, one of the American Eagle affiliates, uses the 
ticket code of a major airline. This makes it appear that the passenger is stay- 
ing on the same airline, but its a rather muddy issue about whether or not it 
really is a different carrier because they are often at different concourses. This 
behavior results  from airlines trying to  capitalize on the  benefits of  feeder 
traffic. No assumption of increased circuitry is necessary if a cost-based study 
of productivity were undertaken in which various characteristics of the airline 
network are controlled for and thus their effects on airline costs estimated (see 
e.g., Good, Nadiri, and Sickles 1991). The increased options, routes, and so 
on that travelers face today are in place because of the tremendous economies 
of  networking  that characterize  communication  technologies.  However, the 
coordination  problem  that exists  with  AT&T has essentially  been  resolved 
with the AR7 switch and more modem digital equipment. The coordination 
problem in the airline industry has not been resolved so costlessly. In order 
to assure that average arrival times coordinate in a complex network that is 
either  in  place  or  being  pursued  by  most  major  carriers,  waiting  times 
must be higher,  absent the coordination problem.  Moreover,  Gordon’s con- 
clusion that ground congestion was not the cause of the increased scheduled 
flights times has a counter argument. Consider the following flight itinerary: 
A *  B +  C +  D. Suppose that airport B is congested. The aircraft leaving 
at time A (a nonhub) might be held on the ground until it can get a slot for 
landing at B. The preclearance improves the safety at airport B by reducing 
the number of planes circling while waiting for a landing slot. Even if C and 
D are nonhub airports, their scheduled arrival time might be later than the old 
flight time because the arrival of the plane at C was delayed by the congestion 
at B. In other words, there are ripple effects of  delay. Saying that they must be 
the results of “in route air traffic control capacity” rather than ground conges- 
tion really ignores the network aspects of airline service. With respect to the 
issue of complaints falling after deregulation,  another indication that quality 
of service improved, it should be pointed out that selectivity problems with 
the complaints data cannot be dismissed. The filing of complaints is largely 
driven by  expectations  about the resolution  of complaints.  When the  Civil 427  Productivity in the Transportation Sector 
Aeronautics Board existed, there was an agency that could modify rewards 
and behavior of the carriers. The Department of Transportation merely keeps 
a tally of  the letters. It has no regulatory teeth. 
In summary, I think the work by Gordon will stand as a focus of empirical 
research in the transportation sector for many years to come. I anticipate that 
the constructed output and input series and conclusions concerning them will 
remain robust to most changes that economists may argue are sensible, my 
comments notwithstanding. 
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